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EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY IN THE AGE OF SPIN: WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE SAY? 
 
History is Philosophy teaching by examples. 
Thucydides: 
 
Rob Watts 
RMIT University   
 
 
The current enthusiasm for evidence-based policy in various policy communities is now 
overwhelmingly well-attested. There is at least one academic journal (Evidence and Policy) devoted to 
promoting evidence-based policy.  Major think-tanks like the Coalition for Evidence Based-Policy in 
the US, the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice and the Campbell Collaboration, both in the 
UK, and agencies like Australia’s Productivity Commission (2009) and its indefatigable Chairman, Gary 
Banks (2009; 2010) have endorsed evidence-based policy strongly. The point of the idea is epitomised 
by the Campbell Collaboration, (a sibling organization of the Cochrane Collaboration famous for its 
promotion of evidence based medicine), which conducts systematic reviews 'of the best evidence on 
the effects of social and educational policies and practices' (The Campbell Collaboration 2003). In the 
United States, the US Coalition for Evidence Based Policy claims to 'promote government policy-
making based on rigorous evidence of program effectiveness'. The sorts of 'rigorous evidence' the 
Coalition include 'randomised controls' to ascertain effectiveness based on evidence-based 
approaches that 'have produced extraordinary advances in human health'. The US Coalition suggests 
that 'in social and economic programs, by contrast, government programs are often implemented 
with little regard to evidence, wasting billions of dollars and failing to address critical needs of our 
society' (US Coalition for Evidence Based Policy 2002).  
 
The ever-increasing volume and the sheer bulk of evidence-based policy literature suggests it is an 
idea whose time has arrived.  Systematic surveys like Davies, Nutley and Smith (2000), Oakley (2000) 
or O’Dwyer (2004) have largely endorsed the idea. O’Donnell (2004) surveyed some 72 major articles, 
while the Productivity Commission (2009) has cited hundreds of papers and reports: see also Parsons 
2002;  Nutley 2003; Martens & Roos 2005; Evans 2007; Pielke 2007; Glasby et al 2007; Cartwright 
2009; Argyrous 2009). 
 
Advocates for evidence-based policy conventionally trace its contemporary origins back to 
exhortations by Britain’s Blair government that policy should be guided by evidence in both the 
‘discovery’ of problems meriting policy responses and/or in the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
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existing policies and programs (Blair 1997; Cabinet Office 1999a; Cabinet Office 1999b). As Britain’s 
Cabinet Office (1999a: 31) put it, neither ‘opinion’ nor ‘ideology’ should make policy.  Instead: 
... policy decisions should be based on sound evidence. The raw ingredient of evidence is 
information. Good quality policy making depends on high quality information, derived from a 
variety of sources - expert knowledge; existing domestic and international research; existing 
statistics; stakeholder consultation; evaluation of previous policies ... (Cabinet Office 1999a:  
31).  
They will also note that evidence-based policy was soon picked up by policy communities in Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia. Canada, eg., which claimed it was taking a leaf out of New Zealand’s book, 
adopted the Canada Performance 2002 project  designed to make ‘public, on an annual basis, data on 
indicators that reflect Canada's economic and social objectives’ (Zussman 2003: 6). This project 
required every Canadian department or agency to identify specific outcomes and indicators by which 
its performance would  be judged.  As Zussman (2003:7) noted ‘the Canada Performance 2002 project 
… aims to create an evidential base for the country's performance as a whole, and make it public …’ 
(See also Davies 2012).    
 
In Australia, as O’Dwyer (2004:10) noted, academics and policy-makers were inspired by the Blair 
government to support ‘evidence-based policy making’.  As a new Labour leader tracking behind   
Blair’s Third Way,  Mark Latham (2001) took poll position in 2001 when he began talking up the value 
of evidence-based policy as part of his promotion of  ‘welfare reform’:   
The myths of the welfare state are based on old ideological ways of thinking, a struggle 
between government-first and market-first policies. It is now clear that both approaches are 
flawed. The world has moved on. Welfare policymakers need to look beyond the old Left and 
the new Right to those evidence-based policies that can end the human tragedy of poverty.  
For Latham, evidence-based policy represented a basis  for going beyond ‘political ideology’. Latham 
treated evidence-based policy as part of a ‘neutral’ technology which would allow  'hard facts' to 
speak for themselves. Seven years later his successor Kevin Rudd (Rudd 2008), speaking as a new 
Prime Minister, put his imprimatur on the idea:  
Policy design and policy evaluation should be driven by analysis of all the available options, and 
not by ideology. When preparing policy advice for the Government, I expect departments to 
review relevant developments among State and Territory governments and comparable 
nations overseas … We’re interested in facts, not fads. … Policy innovation and evidence-based 
policy making is at the heart of being a reformist government.  
 
Yet the contemporary enthusiasm for evidence-based policy at the least is surely puzzling, at the 
worst as symptom of  what Tallis (2011:7) has called ‘a tide of CMTP (or ‘colonic material of a taurine 
provenance’, a widespread contemporary phenomenon dissected elegantly  by the great American 
philosopher Harry Frankfurt (2005).   For those committed to rationality and to the continued salience 
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of virtues like truth and ‘practical wisdom’ (Sharpe and Schwartz 2010),  especially in the public 
sphere  and in policy studies,  need to insist that even ostensibly commonsense ideas like evidence-
based policy need to be  subjected to thoughtful appraisal.  
 
In this paper I address several questions.   Firstly how credible is the conception of ‘evidence’ as an 
objective counter to ‘ideological’ knowledge or ‘opinion’ espoused by advocates of evidence-based 
policy? Secondly what sense is to be made of the coincidence of evidence-based policy and the 
politics of spin? Finally what sense is to be made of the idea that policy be based on sound scientific 
evidence when the problem of ‘wicked problems’ has been repressed by its advocates?  
 
The value of a higher standard of tough rationality than is on display in so much of the evidence-
based policy literature implied by the asking of these questions, is initially suggested by the degree of 
muddle on display in that literature.  
    
1. The coherence of the advocacy for evidence–based policy?  
 
Anyone surveying the evidence-based policy literature will almost certainly notice the semantic and 
conceptual muddle that characterises the field. It is not clear eg., whether ‘descriptions’ of evidence-
based policy are literally descriptive or else normative, or exhortatory. The author/s of Wikipedia 
displaying  the confidence which anonymity confers,  proclaim that ‘evidence-based policy is public 
policy informed by rigorously established  objective evidence. It is an extension of evidence-based 
medicine’ (Wikipedia 2012).  The same confidence, albeit one shot through with contradictions, is 
evident when O’Dwyer (2004: i) says:   
Evidence-based policy is based on research that has undergone some form of quality 
assurance and scrutiny. This distinguishes it from public policy based on more conventional 
policy development processes where intuitive appeal, tradition, politics or the extension of 
existing practice may set the policy agenda.    
She then goes on to claim that evidence-based policy will actually be found in what she calls: 
  … stable policy fields (areas where knowledge is reasonably well settled, theoretical  
foundations are strong, governments broadly know what works, there is a  strong evidence 
based  and incremental knowledge) (O’Dwyer 2004: ii)    
It is odd however that O’Dwyer nowhere provides us with even one example where these conditions 
are met: it is to be seriously doubted whether these conditions obtain anywhere.  Yet pages later, 
when acknowledging the tendency of its advocates to make ‘airy ‘motherhood statements about 
evidence-based policy’, O’Dwyer  allows  that one problem is that  ‘there is actually no evidence (with 
the exception of health)’  that evidence-based policy is actually better than non evidence-based policy 
(O’Dywer 2004: 12).  
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Several other considerations  indicate why we need to be both sharper and more thoughtful than 
seems to be the norm in this particular discursive field.  
 
2. The objectivity of the ‘evidence’ in evidence-based policy?  
 
We might ask eg., what are we to make of the suggestion that there is a  far older provenance for 
evidence-based policy than the Blair  government.  As Davis, Nutley and Smith (2000:25) note, the 
normative idea that  ‘policy be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts’ characterises 
governments in the modern era and well before the Blair government. Those making this case will 
point to disposition the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws of 1832 which employed political 
economists like Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick to construct early versions  of the social survey or 
drew  on the testimony of ‘expert’ witnesses. It is certainly reasonable to allow that  even the most 
cursory survey of the evolution of policy-making in Anglo-American countries over the past two 
centuries will show that  governments frequently claim to  have drawn on  rational, formal processes 
of research and systematic inquiry carried out by committees of inquiry or relying on evidence 
gathered by  expert and increasingly academic communities.   (See from a vast literature on this 
matter,  Furner and  Supple 1990; Brooks and Gagnon, 1994;  O’Connor 2001; see too Oakley (2000)  
on   American policy-making in  the Progressivist program of reform after 1900). Yet surely this is 
question begging on a grand scale.    
 
Leaving aside -if only briefly- the question of what might be meant by ‘evidence’ (see Glasby et al 
2007), claiming that policy-making has long  been oriented to ‘knowledge, truth, reason and facts’ is 
one thing:  establishing what any of this means and how credible it is, is an entirely separate matter.  
 
It is perhaps not odd eg., that  proponents of evidence-based policy so readily assume the mantle of 
the Enlightenment ethos and its progressive telos when they claim to see in evidence-based policy a 
commitment to ‘Enlightenment values’ like rationality and the use of science. Head (2008:1-2) treats 
evidence-based policy as the latest manifestation of the ‘modern emphasis on rational problem 
solving, with its modern focus on accurate diagnosis and knowledge of causal linkages’.1 He points to 
the alliance between progressive political impulses and   systematic knowledge: 
 … reaching back to the late Enlightenment, whose leading thinkers sought to undermine the 
traditional capacity of  governments to  rely on appeals to  precedent, authority and religious 
values’ (Head 2008:9).     
Wells (2004:1) says flatly that, ‘The notion that policy-making should be ‘evidence-based’ rather than 
based on unsupported opinion is difficult to refute’. De Leon and Weible (2010) and Young (2011) eg., 
                                                 
1 Head (2009:13) it should be noted immediately, remains sceptical, calling evidence-based policy ‘an 
aspiration rather than an accomplished outcome’.  
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recall Lasswell’s (1951) classic argument about the ‘well-organised policy cycle’ as the bridge between 
the democratic project and rational knowledge. Almost certainly they have in mind the caricature 
offered up by Harvey (1989:27) when he claimed that those who made the Enlightenment believed:  
That there was only one possible answer to any question.  From this it followed that the 
world could be controlled and rationally if we could only picture and represent it rightly. But 
this presumed that there existed a single correct mode of representation which, if we could 
uncover it (and this was what the scientific and mathematical endeavours [of the ‘scientific 
revolution’] were all about), would provide the means to Enlightenment ends.2 
For evidence-based policy enthusiasts all this has the status of a self-evident truth.  
 
Many of those espousing the virtues of ‘evidence-based medicine’ and ‘evidence-based policy’ appear 
to orient towards a broad-church positivism.  Practitioners of evidence-based medicine (EBM) like the 
Cochrane collaboration have made the randomised, controlled double-blind clinical trial (which 
compares treatments with placebos to determine the most effective therapeutic intervention) the 
'golden standard' of evidence gathering in medicine (The Cochrane Collaboration 2003). Trinder 
(2000) reminds us that evidence-based policy also shares the long-standing positivist predilection for 
the ‘discovery’ of ‘objective’ facts and evidence,  making it possible to exclude the bias imparted 
variously by ‘ideology’, ‘interests’ or ‘the passions’ (Hirschmann 1997) through standardized scientific 
procedures and methods.  
 
That said, Trinder slightly overstates the case.  Some advocates for evidence-based policy, eg.,  allow 
for the admission of ‘qualitative data’ alongside quantitative data.  The ABS (2010: 2) is exemplary in 
this regard when this agency  insists that,  ‘the use of statistical evidence is  vital for making evidence 
based decisions that guide the implementation of new  policy,  monitor  existing policy and evaluate 
the effectiveness of  policy decisions’:. It leavens the positivist cast of its approach when  it  devotes 
one paragraph  to a description of ‘qualitative  data’ (ABS 2010:9).  However it has  already pre-
emptively determined that ‘statistics are a vital source of evidence as they provide us with clear, 
objective, numerical data‘ (ABS 2010: 3).   Head (2008) makes a different point when he insists that 
the dominant ‘rational’ (ie.,  positivist) approach to  evidence needs to be expanded to include   
‘inherently political and value-based’ knowledge.  He insist that ‘policy decisions are not deduced 
primarily from facts and  empirical models but from politics, judgement and debates.  Policy domains 
are inherently marked by the interplay of facts, norms and  desired actions’(Head 2008:9). In this way 
Head (2008) gently reminds us of what has been forgotten. 
                                                 
2For studies that make it impossible to continue to perpetuate this myth, see  Israel, J., 2002  Radical 
Enlightenment, Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
and  Holmes, R., 2011, The Age of Wonder: How the Romantic generation discovered the Terror and 
Beauty of Science, Pantheon, New York. See too what Deutsch (2012:38) has recently called one of 
the defining aspects of the   Enlightenment ethos, its ‘affirmative skepticism’.         
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Many of the advocates for evidence-based policy have forgotten that if ‘scientific method’ was a 
central aspect of the Enlightenment conception of ‘rationality’, so too was the practice of critique and 
refutation,  or what Deutsch (2012) calls ‘affirmative skepticism’.     
 
That tradition of ‘affirmative skepticism’ informs the development of post-positivist philosophy of 
science initiated by Karl Popper (2002: see also Quine, 1975; Bloor 1991; Hacking 2004). As many 
writers have noticed,  the advocates for the application of 'scientific method', especially to the social 
world  tended to  privilege a naïve idea of facts as  ‘out there’ waiting to be ‘discovered’. Danziger 
calls this framework the 'Sleeping Beauty' model (1990: 2) where the facts are awakened by the touch 
of the scientist-as-prince. Popper’s central insight was that the ‘facts’ neither exist  independently of 
us or outside of the theoretical or constitutive frameworks that make them possible or bring them 
into existence. In effect all facts are already dependent on us believing certain larger theoretical  
frameworks to be true: facts are already theory-laden.  (Putnam (2005) has made the same point 
about the interconnectedness of ‘fact-value’ propositions which subverts the Humean case for 
maintaining a strict dichotomy between ‘facts’ and ‘values’). As Popper (2002) argued, all of the ‘hard’ 
sciences work with constructive schemes which mandate and regulate certain assumptions and 
practices about what is to count as ‘evidence’ and as 'real' as well as what practices (like 
measurement, replicability, or experimental procedure) will permit the generation of explanatory, 
predictive statements long held to be the technical hallmarks of 'scientific method'. Holton (1984) 
documented the role played by ‘themata’ especially in such physical sciences as physics.   
 
This point about  theory-laden facts is easily grasped with reference to the Victorian revolution in 
government of the early nineteenth century.  Writers like Dean (1990) have shown that the volumes 
of ‘evidence’ collected in the famous Blue Books, was discursively constituted by the advocates of 
nineteenth century liberal governmentality and the ‘themata’ like ‘individual responsibility’,  
‘philanthropy’ and ideas about ‘poverty’ and ‘pauperism’. Here although reliant on a Foucauldian 
vocabulary of inquiry, Dean is simply making the point made by post-positivist philosophers of science 
that ‘facts-and-theories’ and ‘facts-and-values’ form an effective unity which are really only amenable 
only to analytic  separation.   A little etymology here is useful: our word  ‘fact’ comes from the Latin 
fascere which means ‘to make’ or ‘to do’, hence ‘factory’ a place where things are made, or ‘factor’, 
the old term for a servant. A fact refers both things made up  or to the deeds or events which about 
which we might draw legal or other conclusions.  
  
In effect, thinking about the idea that ‘policy be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts’, 
necessarily raises fundamental problems which cannot simply be swept under the rug by people who 
insist on the centrality of ‘facts’ uncontaminated by values or theories.  Those problems are best 
understood by what Hacking (2004) calls  ‘historical ontology’.  Like Foucault (1991), and Kosseleck 
(2002), Hacking understands that all human modes and styles of cognition requires the construction 
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and use of ‘categories’ and conceptual schemes, and that the construction and use of categories have 
a history.  Accordingly we need to address the interplay between categories (like the ‘evidence’ 
category itself, to say nothing of categories designed historically to nominate forms of social action or 
social relationships, like ‘crime’, ‘unemployment’ or ‘poverty’ and so forth), the empirically verifiable 
‘stuff’ of reality, and the scientific practices of observers and socials scientists.   In short the claim that 
policy has long been  ‘informed by  knowledge, truth, reason and facts’ cannot be treated as a self-
explanatory  statement so much as a provocation to establish  in what ways we can agree that the 
historical  or the contemporary collection of evidence/data or its testing, was, or is  actually ‘truthful’,  
‘rational’ or ‘factual’.  
 
Worse as any number of major policy scholars have demonstrated, the naivete of ‘evidence-based 
policy’ advocates talking about ‘objective facts’ is as nothing compared to when Reid (2003) points to 
an  ‘inconvenient truth’. Reid (2003:20) notes her surprise  at: 
…the lack of evidence for evidence-based policymaking either as a process which  can take 
place, or as a process which will lead to better policy outcomes.  It might be argued  that, far 
from  being unideological, evidence-based policy is, in itself a kind of ideology, and one for 
which there is remarkably little  supporting evidence. 
This failure is  not a recent failure. It is  a sobering, no-less inconvenient truth, that the  dominant 
neo-positivist paradigm on offer in the social and policy sciences, in spite of heroic recent advocacy by 
the likes of Elster (2007) has simply failed either to develop a ‘useable body of predictive 
generalisations’ or ‘supply effective solutions to social problems’ (Fischer 1998:10: see also Lindblom 
1990; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Head 2008).  It would require a considerable diversion to make this 
large point here so Lemert (1995) or Bishop (2007) must carry the weight of this argument.  
 
3. Evidence-based policy in the Age of Spin? 
  
A more interesting and  substantial problem is posed by  the juxtaposition of the enthusiasm for 
evidence-based policy with  the extent to which  modern politics and policy making is now 
inseparable from  ‘spin’.  
 
A literature far larger than that which acknowledges  the esteem in which evidence is now held, 
attests to the power of what we now call ‘spin’ but which in earlier, plainer  times we called 
‘propaganda’.  The larger significance of this for our understanding of contemporary democracy has 
been spelled out by Wolin (2008) and his account of ‘inverted totalitarianism’.3 Wolin belongs to a 
                                                 
3 Wolin’s treatment is far removed from the older literature on the links between totalitarianism and 
propaganda. Ellul (1965) mindful of the use of modern media made by totalitarian states in the 1930s,  
insisted eg., on the totalising reach of propaganda which:  
… reaches individuals enclosed in the mass and as participants in that mass, yet it also aims at 
a crowd, but only as a body composed of individuals. Propaganda must be total. The 
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classic tradition of inquiry constituted by Arendt (1958; 1967), Ellul (1973),  Hermann and Chomsky 
(1988) and Habermas (1989).  It is  a tradition which worries about the effects for democratic politics 
of the increasingly managed flow of political opinion and information in whatever passes now for the 
‘public sphere’(eg., Calhoun 1992; Dahlgren, 2005). Wolin implies that the US is the only nation-state 
to manifest the key features of what he calls  ‘inverted  totalitarianism’ and  ‘managed democracy’.  It 
is hard however not to see in his account more than a passing reference to the contemporary political 
culture of Australia or the UK.   
 
Wolin  insists  that three key feature distinguish contemporary ‘inverted  totalitarianism’ from earlier 
state-centric models of ‘totalitarianism’ found in Italy, Germany or the former USSR in the 1930s and 
1940’s. In formal terms those features include the key difference that while  the state dominated the 
market in the  totalitarian models of the 1930s, under  inverted totalitarianism business interests use 
contributions, public relations  and lobbying to ensure that the government acts to promote the 
interests of  large corporations, and ‘the market’ more generally. This is considered ‘normal’ rather 
than corruption (Wolin 2008: 51).   Secondly and again unlike the original totalitarian forms which 
sought to mobilise the people  continuously or to elicit their will  through  plebiscites,   managed 
democracies seem to prefer to keep the mass of the population in a persistent state of political 
apathy. The only type of political activity expected or desired from the people is voting. Low electoral 
turnouts in England or the USA are treated as evidence  that everyone accepts  the  situation rather 
than treating it  an indication that the bulk of the population has given up expecting  that the 
government will ever help them (Wolin 2008: 64).  Finally while the totalitarian states openly ridiculed 
the democracies of the 1930s,  modern managed democracies claim that democracy is the only 
political form  to have proved its legitimacy (Wolin 2008: 52). sx Indeed so convinced of this  are some 
managed democracies that democracy warrants being exported courtesy of militarily imposed regime 
change  or via the aggressive promotion of a human rights agenda -even though their own   record  
less than squeaky clean on this score (see Ignatieff 2005).  
 
That Wolin’s is a normative conception of politics is clearly suggested when he writes: 
It is all politics all of the time but a politics largely untempered by the political. Party squabbles 
are occasionally on public display, and there is a frantic and continuous politics among factions 
of the party, interest groups, competing corporate powers, and rival media concerns. And 
there is, of course, the culminating moment of national elections when the attention of the 
nation is required to make a choice of personalities rather than a choice between alternatives. 
                                                                                                                                           
propagandist must utilize all the technical means at his disposal- the press, radio Propaganda 
tries to surround man by all possible routes, in the realm of feelings as well as ideas, by playing 
on his will or on his needs, through his conscious and his unconscious, assailing him in both his 
private and his public-life. It furnishes him with a complete system for explaining the world, 
and provides immediate incentives to action. 
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What is absent is the political, the commitment to finding where the common good lies amidst 
the welter of well-financed, highly organized, single-minded interests rabidly seeking 
governmental favors and overwhelming the practices of representative government and public 
administration by a sea of cash (Wolin 2008: 66).    
 
Wolin’s part in a tradition marked by concern for the effect on politics of  managing the flow of 
opinion and knowledge is clear.  Wolin  understands the point made by so-called father of 
propaganda (aka ‘public relations’) by Bernays (1928: 37), even if he does not accept Bernay’s  
functionalism, or his  apologia for propaganda: 
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses 
is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism 
of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country ... 
We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by 
men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society 
is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate in this manner if they are to live 
together as a smoothly functioning society. 
 
The contemporary repression of the term ‘propaganda’ and the preference for talking instead about  
‘spin’ itself speaks volumes. It is characteristic eg., that writing about the Australian case,  Ward 
(2003:25) has suggested we should now be taking the idea that we have a ‘public relations state’ 
seriously,  if only because the  ‘broad contours of the Australian PR state seem clear enough’ by which 
Ward means   ‘a whole-of-government integration of information disclosure activities’.   The more 
serious albeit ironic point to be made is that if the Blair government is associated with the rise of 
evidence-based policy it is his government which also sponsored a revival of  interest in spin.    So 
along with a vast literature on evidence-based policy we also have an ever-ramifying literature 
documenting the evolution of modern ‘spin’ and its effects (eg., Kurz 1998; Jones 1997; Cappella and 
Jamieson 1997; Franklin 1994; Garnham 1992; Beresford 1998;  Harris 1999; Harris Moss and  Vetter 
1999; Harris and Wring 2002; Partington 2003; van Onselen & Errington, 2005, Stockwell 2007; Jones 
2007; Pearson and Mclean  2010). Equally and  perhaps as might have been expected,  the 
juxtaposition of the Blair government’s enthusiasm for evidence-based policy with  its enthusiastic 
use of spin seems to have largely gone unremarked. This probably reflects the refusal to contemplate 
what is actually at stake. 
 
What is at stake is suggested by the paradigm case of the evidence collected in favour of the invasion 
of Iraq by allied nations led by the US in 2003.  As is now well established,  the governments of the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Australia mobilized popular support for,  and then legitimized 
their  invasion of Iraq by claiming that the Hussein regime possessed weapons of mass destruction 
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(WMD).4 In each case the respective governments mounted an unstinting and costly effort to 
successfully mobilize public (ie., media) opinion in favour of an invasion. These regimes claimed that 
their intelligence agencies had evidence contained in dossiers pointing to the existence of WMD.  The 
pursuit of indubitable evidence of those WMD afire the invasion of Iraq began  proved to be a difficult 
task.  This was not surprising given the fact that there were no WMD. Spin proved decisively more 
influential  than any evidence.  
 
That said,  the contemporary dominance of spin seems to be defined most commonly in relatively 
anodyne ways. Grattan (1997:34) eg., speaks simply of ‘the highly professional selling of the political 
message that involves maximum management and manipulation of the media’.   Stockwell (2007: 2) 
implies that  ‘spin’ involves simply :  
… the backgrounding and interpretation supplied by media advisers to the press to put 
politicians’ pronouncements in a favourable context and to ensure that the message that they 
(the politicians) are trying to get across, actually appears in the media.  
However Mayer (1994) put a more provoking view of spin, one which opens up the question of truth 
and thereby the relationship of spin to  evidence-based policy. He did this when he   pointedly 
suggested:  
…political advertising is necessarily full of deception, half-truths, exaggerations and falsities. It 
is that way because all forms of politics are that way, but political lies are not like lies about 
soap or cornflakes. Politics does not deal with ‘products’ which can be checked and evaluated 
in the way a car can be ... If worried enough to care, you can compare brands of way you can 
compare soft appeals which rely on fantasy, pride, ego-boosting, fear or alienation. (Mayer, 
1994: 119)  
Mayer goes on to subvert the very conception of truth: 
If you found a way to make all political advertising rational and accurate, or even if you 
improved its rationality and accuracy greatly, what would you have to do? . . . You would have 
to eliminate politics as we know it (Mayer, 1994: 116)  
Indeed Mayer proposed  a model of political deception in ways that parallel Arendt’s (1967) even 
more ironic treatment of the relationship of truth and politics. 
                                                 
4 The case for invasion rested on the claim that Iraq had missiles, nuclear capability and lots of 
biological and chemical weaponry. The chief source used by the Bush administration  in 2002-3 to 
justify its claims was a low grade technician, taxi driver and fantasist (Drogin 2007) As late as 2002 
investigators with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) like Scott Ritter were confirming 
(See Stampton & Rauber 2003). The claims vigorously promoted by the American and British 
governments were accepted by the Australian government.  We also now know that the US 
government spent billions of dollars after 1998 hiring leading PR companies like Beers, to promote an 
increasingly hostile view of Iraq after 1998.  
 
 
 11 
Yet the possibility that modern politics and policy making has less to do with a regard for 
truth and more with ‘spin’, points to a number of problems about the interaction between 
politics and knowledge in which some conception of truth remains as Arendt (2005:  5-8) 
suggested,  a vital issue in the practice of politics and the practice of persuasion.    
 
Arednt adopts the view that politics and what she calls ‘factual truth’ are antagonistic. Her 
(1967)  discussion of the terms of that antagonism begins with  a distinction between ‘rational 
truths’ and ‘factual truths’ even though she  really wants to talks about factual truths. ‘Rational 
truths’ are the truths given by philosophy, science and  mathematics like the proposition  that the 
three angles of a triangle necessarily are always equal to  two angles of a square.   ‘Factual truths’ 
deal with human events and facts about which it is possible to tell lies  -and do so successfully. 
‘Factual truths’ are about factual realities which are mutable and can change over time. We can also 
produce  factual truths about opinions, events, and decisions.  
 
While factual truths can be about opinions they are not opinion’s. It is a fact eg.  that Germany 
invaded Belgium in 1914 )and not the other way around), or that France collapsed  before the 
German armies in 1940.  
Factual truth  … is always related to other people: it concerns  events and circumstances  in 
which many are involved; it is established  by eyewitnesses and depends upon testimony … It is 
political by nature.  Facts and opinions thought they must be kept apart,  are not antagonistic 
to each other; they belong to the same realm  (Arendt, 1967:300)   
Factual truths reflect the messiness of the world. The realm of human affairs is defined by what Kant 
called the ‘melancholy haphazardness’ of a sequence of events which makes up the course of the 
world   ‘Facts  have no conclusive reason for being  what they are; they could always have  been 
otherwise and this annoying  contingency  is literally unlimited’. .   
 
Truths, whether rational or factual, share one trait in that ‘they are beyond  agreement, dispute, 
opinion or consent.  They are not changed by the numbers or lack of numbers who entertain the 
same proposition’ (Arendt 1967: 302).  From the viewpoint of politics,  ‘factual truths are despotic 
and uncomfortable and so enjoy a precarious  status in the eyes of government  that rest on consent 
and abhor coercion’. Truth is hated by tyrants  ‘because facts are beyond  agreement and consent and 
all talk about them –all exchanges  of opinion based  on correct information will contribute nothing to 
their  establishment’.  As she says ‘unwelcome  fact possess an infuriating stubbornness that nothing 
can overcome  except plain lies’. Equally those with power and opinion which finds these facts 
unpalatable can  and will set out to subvert truth; even Jefferson who declared in his draft of the US 
Declaration of Independence that certain propositions  like ‘all men are created equal’  were  self-
evident  truths, necessarily implied that they were nothing of the sort,  but stood in need of  
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agreement and consent, both distinctively political attributes: to become politically relevant  these 
truths needed to mutate into opinions so that they  could enter the ‘political realm’.    
 
‘Truth though powerless and always defeated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a 
strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive  they are unable to  discover  or invent a 
viable substitute for it.  Persuasion and violence can  destroy  truth but they cannot replace it’ (Arendt 
1967: 309).  This is why Arendt suggests that  ‘The hallmark of  factual truth  is that its opposite  is 
neither error nor  illusion, no one of which  reflects  upon personal truthfulness,  but the deliberate 
falsehood or lie,  Error  of course is [also] possible  and even common  with respect to factual truth …  
 
Arendt shares with Mayer a darker insight into the increasing reliance on propaganda and deception  
suchthat  the result of  a consistent and total sunpbstiution of lies for  
 
truth is in one sense only possible  from an outsider’s position and so outside the political realm  here 
she speaks of the ‘solitude’ of the philosopher, the ‘isolation’ of the artist and  scientist, the  
‘impartiality’ of the historian  and the  judge(1967: 310).   Likewise Arendt praises the judiciary and 
the university as special spaces devoted to truth telling: ‘…  very unwelcome truths have emerged 
form the universities and very unwelcome judgments have  been handed down from the  bench from 
time to time’ such that  the chances for truth to prevail  in public are  greatly   improved by the 
existence of such places’.  
 
      
 
 
Does this consideration alone suggest something about the way an idea like ‘evidence-based 
policy’ needs to be put in context?  I think so hence my intention to critically appraise the 
idea of evidence-based policy, with a view to establishing if  evidence-based policy can live 
up to its promise as an idea whose time has come (Young et al., 2002). In addressing a few of 
the questions that matter, I begin by exploring the idea of ‘evidence’ in evidence-based 
policy. Finding a coherent account of evidence-based policy is a difficult task. In much of the 
policy literature the meaning of ‘evidence’ and ‘evidence-based policy’ is treated as if it is 
either self-explanatory or else is collapsed back into one form or other of a narrow band of 
‘empiricist’ or  ‘quantitative’ research methods. As we suggest here far more is at stake than 
some methodological squabbles. If we take seriously the ideas of putting evidence-based 
policy back into its context then we cannot help but observe that any discussion of evidence-
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based policy needs to engage the fundamental relation of knowledge  and  political 
processes mediated by preferences interests and conceptual schema.   
 
Simply claiming that the past few centuries have actually been characterised by 
governments making use of ‘rational’ or ‘factual’ research based evidence is reckless in a 
number of ways. One of those ways   is that such claims inevitably raises a major problem 
which should never have been forgotten about, namely why is it that policy-makers continue 
to face  ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel & Webber 1973).  This problem, which has only 
occasionally been acknowledged in the Australian policy literature (Australian Public Service 
Commission 2007; Public Policy Institute 2011),  seems nonetheless  to have been 
significantly repressed in quite interesting ways in the  recent discussion about evidence-
based policy, and along with it the vexed question what ‘evidence’ will be used to show that 
‘What counts is what works’ (Blair 1997). Head (2009) eg., represses the issue of wicked 
problems] ie the role played by scientism.  
 
Here I  address  three questions  
1.What conception of evidence is at work in the EBP movement ? 
2. Why are some problems wicked   and why has the problem of wicked problems been 
repressed by EBP?  [Head (2009) eg., represses the issue of wicked problems] ie the role 
played by scientism … 
3. What light does Arendt shed on the relation of truth to politics in an age of spin? 
I begin by considering what conception of evidence appears to lie at the heart of the EBP 
idea. 
 
Simply claiming that the past few centuries have actually been characterised by 
governments making use of ‘rational’ or ‘factual’ research based evidence is reckless in a 
number of ways. One of those ways   is that such claims inevitably raises a major problem 
which should never have been forgotten about, namely why is it that policy-makers continue 
to face  ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel & Webber 1973).  This problem, which has only 
occasionally been acknowledged in the Australian policy literature (Australian Public Service 
Commission 2007; Public Policy Institute 2011),  seems nonetheless  to have been 
significantly repressed in quite interesting ways in the  recent discussion about evidence-
based policy, and along with it the vexed question what ‘evidence’ will be used to show that 
‘What counts is what works’ (Blair 1997).  
 14 
 
THE ORIGINS AND CONTEXT OF EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY 
  
Those who promote  'evidence-based policy' rely on the  credibility  accruing from  
‘evidence-based medicine’. This legacy of ideas even now informs the contemporary 
enthusiasm  for evidence-based policy both  overseas and in Australia.  
 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is the process of systematically finding, appraising, and 
using research findings as the basis for clinical decisions.  The philosophical underpinnings of 
evidence-based medicine are clearly those belonging to a broad-church positivism. This is 
evident eg., in the way the 'golden standard' of evidence gathering in medicine is the 
randomised controlled trial, which compares treatments with placebos to determine the 
most effective intervention (The Cochrane Collaboration 2003). The Cochrane Collaboration, 
first established in the United Kingdom, has been at the forefront of the push for systematic 
up-to-date reviews of all relevant randomized controlled trials of health care (Trinder & 
Reynolds 2000). The results of these systematic reviews are posted electronically on the 
Cochrane Library to form a searchable database.   
 
The rigorous ‘scientific’ process of systematically reviewing the effects of health care 
treatments underpins evidence-based medicine. Widely adopted in the United Kingdom, 
and increasingly in the United States, evidence-based medicine is used to identify the most 
appropriate and effective way to promote health and to treat illnesses.  In this sense it has 
both educative and clinical functions (Solesbury 2001). The logic of evidence-based medicine 
has spread out of acute medicine into allied health professions and then into related areas 
like social work and human service practice (McDonald 2002).  
 
Yet the take-up of evidence-based medicine has not met with universal approval. Some 
commentators suggest that evidence-based medicine constrains other forms of scientific 
research and/or promotes an overly narrow range of research methodologies (Reynolds 
2000: 32). These comments are directly relevant to debates about the value of evidence-
based policy, as the disciplinary and methodological roots of the 'evidence-based' discourse 
in acute medicine has implications for how these ideas are transferred to other areas of 
professional practice, such as policy-making in the human services.   
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Researchers and policy-makers in Britain have been driving the evidence-based policy 
movement, aiming to systematically mobilize and use social science research. The Campbell 
Collaboration, a sibling organization of the Cochrane Collaboration, focuses on social policy 
research and aims to conduct systematic reviews 'of the best evidence on the effects of 
social and educational policies and practices' (The Campbell Collaboration 2003). Beyond 
making systematic reviews electronically available for policy practitioners, evidence-based 
policy is also seen by some as a way of bringing social science researchers and their work 
into closer alignment with government decision-making processes (Parsons 2001).  
 
Not surprisingly, there have been vigorous debates in the UK about the implications of this 
trend, regarding the appropriate relationship between universities and government 
decision-makers, intellectual property rights and academic freedom.5  The Economic and 
Social Research Council, the Britain’s leading independent agency for funding research and 
training in the economic and social sciences, has been caught up in these debates. 
Commenting on these issues, Solesbury (2001: 4) observes that 'the Economic and Social 
Research Council has been subjected to the demands of government science policy that 
views academic research as a means to economic and social development, much more than 
a cultural end in itself'. These efforts have been coordinated by a number of Economic and 
Social Research Council funding initiatives. In 1999, for example, the ESRC provided 1.3 
million pounds to the Evidence Network - the UK Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and 
Practice for a period of three years:   
The primary objectives of the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice are to 
foster the exchange of research-based evidence between policy researchers and 
practitioners, and to accelerate the development of methods of appraising and 
summarising the results of research relevant to policy and practice. It will also aim to 
improve the quality of research and practice, and through its dissemination function 
inform and advise those in policy-making roles (Evidence Network - UK Centre for 
Evidence Based Policy and Practice, 2002).  
 
                                                 
5 In Britain both Liberal Democratic politicians and academics have publicly raised concerns about the 
increasing practice of government departments amending research reports before publication and 
contractual conditions that insist researchers seek departmental permission before speaking publicly 
to the media about research findings (British Educational Research Foundation, 2001). 
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These objectives are similar to the aims and methods of the Cochrane Collaboration and the 
Campbell Collaboration outlined earlier, where the intention is to systematically review 
available research for practitioners working in a range of policy settings.   
 
The Cabinet Office Centre for Management and Policy Studies in the United Kingdom 
(1999a; 1999b; 2001) has produced a number of strategic documents aimed at 'modernising 
the policy-making process'. Evidence-based policy is seen as a core dimension of this 
process.  In the 1999 British Cabinet Office White Paper on Modernising Government, 
evidence-based policy is understood as including:  
 
• Reviewing existing research; 
• Commissioning new research; 
• Consulting relevant experts; and 
• Considering a range of properly costed and appraised options. 
 
From the perspective of those advocating for an evidence-based approach, professional 
policy-making is best driven by 'evidence' of 'what works', following a series of systematic 
steps (eg., Parsons 2001). In the United States, the US Coalition for Evidence Based Policy 
aims to 'promote government policy-making based on rigorous evidence of program 
effectiveness'. The sorts of 'rigorous evidence' the Coalition promotes consist of 
'randomised controls' to ascertain effectiveness based on evidence-based approaches that 
'have produced extraordinary advances in human health'. The US Coalition suggests that 'in 
social and economic programs, by contrast, government programs are often implemented 
with little regard to evidence, wasting billions of dollars and failing to address critical needs 
of our society' (US Coalition for Evidence Based Policy 2002). In this approach to 'evidence', 
the term takes on a new meaning as a resource-rationing tool, which goes beyond its 
educative and clinical purposes outlined earlier.   
 
Underpinning the Cochrane Collaboration and other evidence-based initiatives is the long 
standing positivist expectation that it is both possible and desirable to exclude bias through 
standardized, rational and neutral procedures  and to generate ‘objective’ ‘rational’ and 
‘truthful’ evidence (Trinder 2000).  From outside that perspective the emergence of 
evidence-based policy is bets understood as an offshoot of the instrumentalist mode of 
managerial ‘reforms’ that have infiltrated public administration practices in many western 
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democracies over the past three decades. Trinder (2000) argues that the managerialist 
emphasis on ‘value for money’ and a ‘focus on effectiveness and efficiency is a central 
driving force behind evidence-based practice and policy'. In the case of managerial reforms 
and evidence-based policy, the technical logic is similarly concerned with procedural 
competence, rather than substantive output.  
 
Wicked problems  
 
 
 
In particular the question of whether and by what means the advocates of evidence-
based policy believe that relying on ‘evidence’ somehow overcomes certain basic 
problems in the vexed relationship between politics and truth ought to be a central 
issue in our time.  Certainly one suspicion is that those appealing to evidence based 
policy are making some claim that policy-making itself is already, or might become a 
‘science’ (Grayson 2007). As Young, et al. (2002: 215) observe this claim may refer 
somewhat ambiguously either to 'to the way in which policy is made … [or] to the 
evidential nature of social science itself'. Either way this proposition has been 
contested quite sharply by Mulgan (2005: 224) when he suggests that in ‘a 
democracy, the people and the politicians have every right to ignore evidence’.   
 
Our starting point is that whatever the merits of the natural or social sciences we 
need to accept that most if not all policy-making exercises, as some experienced 
policy-makers will all too readily acknowledge, are ultimately and necessarily 
political processes (Rose 1999; Edwards 2000; Bessant et al 2006). This suggests that 
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there is more at stake here than a somewhat narrow and typically academic 
preoccupation with issues of methodology such as occurs when social scientists 
adjudicate the merits of various styles or research, research methodologies or 
evaluate ‘data’.  
 
 
 
 
After all,  
This sheds an interesting light on the political and policy use of evidence, and opens 
up a series of interesting questions about the character and role of evidence in 
contemporary policy-making processes more generally. Certainly as writers like Rose 
(1996) have suggested, the relationship of evidence to fantasy evident in state policy 
exercises may need to be taken more seriously than simple-minded empiricists seem 
able or willing to do. Any consideration of the juxtaposition of the enthusiasm for 
evidence-based policy and the recognition that modern politics has less to do with a 
regard for truth and more with ‘spin’ points to a number of problems about the 
interaction between politics and knowledge in which some conception of truth 
remains as Arendt (2005:  5-8) suggested,  a vital issue in the practice of politics and 
the practice of persuasion.  At stake as we show are serious questions about truth, 
political judgment and the strange usages to which evidence can be put.  
 
Le us start with the idea of evidence-based policy itself.      
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************* 
In Australia, it is clear that  evidence-based policy has begun to reshape the social 
and public policy field, especially in the lexicon of policy-makers working in both the 
community and government sectors. However in contrast to the United Kingdom, 
there is no formal coalition or central coordinating ‘think tank’ actively promoting 
this agenda at a Commonwealth Government or State Government level. 
Nonetheless, within and across government departments there are signs that 
evidence-based policy is being actively promoted across a number of different fields 
of social policy. In 1998, the Commonwealth Department of Health and Family 
Services was talking about the need to translate evidence-based medicine into 
evidence-based policy, which is defined in terms of assisting the provision of safe, 
cost-effective and beneficial treatments (Whitworth, 1998). Again in the health field, 
the National Health and Medical Research Council (2003) offers Practitioner 
Fellowships on the basis that they contribute to  'evidence-based policy 
development in Australian health systems'. It is not really surprising that the health 
field has been the first to take up the evidence-based discourse, given the proximity 
of this profession to acute medicine.  
 
There are plenty of signs that evidence-based policy is being taken up in other areas 
of public administration. The Department of Family and Community Services (DFaCS) 
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Annual Report 2000-01 refers to evidence-based policy, by way of 'making 
administrative data more accessible to the Minister, DFaCS staff and the Australian 
community' (DFaCS, 2001). In this account, evidence-based policy is defined along 
the lines of accessible information provision for policy-makers and the general 
public, echoing the aims of The Campbell Collaboration. In the area of income 
support, Centrelink's 2002-05 Business Plan makes a case for Centrelink's being 'a 
key player in developing and delivering evidence-based policy solutions for 
customers, client agencies, community and government' (Centrelink, 2002). A 
Commonwealth Department of Education, Training & Youth Affairs publication on 
The Impact of Educational Research on school education quotes a senior official, who 
argues that 'schools will only accept changes that are strongly evidence-based' and 
that 'research helps to de-politicise educational reform' (DETYA, 2000: 190).  
 
In this context, research evidence is treated as a ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ policy tool 
that is apparently above political ideology. Increased targeting of social policy 
programs and the shift towards 'outcomes based funding' in the non-government 
human services sector also provides fertile ground for evidence-based discourse. 
Non-government welfare agencies must increasingly quantify what they are doing, 
what works and why. In the human services, evidence-based policy cannot be 
separated from a broader political context where eg.,  
… efficiency becomes the primary political value, replacing discussions of 
justice and interest with discussions of what is possible and practical, with 
means rather than ends, with methods rather than truth' (Smith & Kulynych 
2002: 163).   
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Australian research institutes, funded by the Commonwealth Government, have  
also begun adopting the language of evidence-based policy. The Australian Institute 
of Family Studies was funded in the 2000-2001 Federal Budget to undertake a 
Longitudinal Study of Australian Children. According to the first paper on the project: 
 … the Strategy is based on a holistic approach to problem identification, 
prevention and early intervention, and a commitment to evidence-based policy 
and practice' (AIFS 2002).  
Winter and Seelig (2001: 6) have promoted the idea of evidence-based policy and 
research in Australian housing studies as involving the use of 'evidence for policy 
formation'. Young et al (2002: 216) refer to this conceptualisation of research-policy 
relations as the knowledge driven model, where it is assumed that knowledge leads, 
or at least should lead policy.   
 
Actors in the political field have also been drawing on the concept. In Australian 
federal politics, for example, a variety of leading ALP politicians have espoused the 
virtues of evidence.   Mark Latham (2001) took poll position in 2001 when he began 
talking up the value of  evidence-based policy as part of his promotion of  ‘welfare 
reform’:   
 
The myths of the welfare state are based on old ideological ways of thinking, 
a struggle between government-first and market-first policies. It is now clear 
that both approaches are flawed. The world has moved on. Welfare 
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policymakers need to look beyond the old Left and the new Right to those 
evidence-based policies that can end the human tragedy of poverty.  
 
For Latham evidence-based policy represented a useful tool and theoretical 
metaphor for going beyond political ideology. Latham treats evidence-based policy 
as a ‘neutral’ concept where 'hard facts' will speak for themselves in addressing 
'human tragedy' and politicians and policy makers will act accordingly based on the 
best available evidence.  
 
This brief account of how evidence-based policy has entered the Australian social 
policy discourse is far from comprehensive. However, it illustrates different 
manifestations of evidence-based policy and the inroads that it is making into public 
management and social policy in Australia and other parts of the western world. A 
simple part of the reason for current interest in evidence-based policy may be 
explained by the 'common sense' nature of the term. It is difficult to imagine anyone 
standing up and arguing that policy should not be based on anything but the best 
available evidence. The idea has an intuitive logic, which helps to explain how the 
concept is ‘naturalized’ in a diverse range of policy settings. As Tilley and Laycock 
(2000: 13) argue: 'rooting policy in evidence has all the appeal of motherhood and 
apple pie. The rhetoric is cheap and easy'. The term works as a conventional catch 
phrase synonymous with  'scientific', scholarly' and 'rationality', constituting a 
rhetorical framework for thinking about modern policy-making and professional 
human service practice in highly positive ways.   
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This is especially apparent in the UK and Australia where evidence-based policy is 
made part of a 'modernising' agenda where policy-making scholars and practitioners 
assume the mantle of scholarly, scientific and above or else rational practice. (Where 
once the science of government was treated as matter for universities to organise   
(signified for example by the establishment of the LSE in 1909 or Bland’s 
establishment of  a School of Government at Sydney University in the 1930s, the 
modern way involves institutional ‘partnerships’ between governments and 
universities like ANZSOG).  In this respect, 'the resurgence of evidence-based policy-
making might be seen as a re-affirmation of the 'modernist' project, the enduring 
legacy of the Enlightenment, involving the improvement of the world through the 
application of reason' (Sanderson, 2002: 1). In sum, the evidence-based policy 
movement is premised on the simple proposition that scientific research evidence 
has an inherent value in the everyday politics of policy-making.  
 
However the question whether ‘empirical research’ actually assures a sufficiently 
secure grasp of the social world to deliver reliable insights into that world able to 
inform defensible policies is another, far more serious question. To raise that 
question leads to other no less interesting questions like how much weight should, 
or could ever be given to research evidence in policy-making processes.  Are not all 
policy-making exercises as even hardened policy-makers will acknowledge, 
ultimately and necessarily, a political process? (Rose 1999; Edwards 2000). A second 
set of questions that also need some elucidation entails asking what kinds of 
evidence are the promoters of evidence-based policy advocating? Are some kinds of 
evidence to be privileged over others? Are the current conceptions of 'evidence' eg., 
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based on certain narrowly conceived methodologies that privilege certain forms of 
methods and knowledge over others?  
 
Our interest here is in critically appraising the emergence of evidence-based policy 
discourse in Australia.  While we cannot address all of the questions that matter it is 
possible to ask whether evidence-based policy can live up to its promise as an idea 
whose time has come (Young et al., 2002). That the enthusiasm for evidence is both 
more curious and more paradoxical than might be immediately apparent is 
suggested by several considerations.  
 
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY IN AN AGE OF SPIN: THE CASE OF POVERTY AND 
WELFARE POLICY 
 
Firstly there is the coincidence of the commitment of governments, including 
Britain’s Blair government and the Howard government, to both evidence-based 
policy and to the politics of spin. The extent to which this conjunction involves a 
contradiction or various combinations of hypocrisy or stupidity is a moot question 
given the primacy now accorded to ceaselessly gathering data about the state of 
public opinion provided by relentless polling most of it generated by and then 
reported in the media. Campbell’s (2007) insider’s account of how the ‘politics of 
spin’ worked in Whitehall points to the serious consequences for politics itself.  
Ballard (2007: 100) eg.,  is not alone when he observes how modern politics has 
been reconstituted for the age of cable TV news.  The result is a politics reliant on:  
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… fleeting impressions, an illusion of meaning floating over a sea of undefined 
emotions … a virtual politics unconnected to any reality, one which defines 
reality as itself [and one  in which] the public willingly colludes in its own 
deception.  
Bourdieu (2008: 189) with his characteristic acerbic ability to get to the point  
characterises modern politics as a process in which politicians:  
… enclose themselves ever more in their hermetic pursuit, often with no other 
communication wit the outside world except polls that produce responses by 
the very questions they impose, and a number of them, moved solely by a 
concern to  simply exist (like pretenders) or survive (like dethroned 
champions), mutually determine one another in actions that, far from being 
based on ethical conviction or devotion to a political cause, are no more than 
reactions to the reactions of others. The peak of perversion is reached when, 
with television performance becoming the measure of all things, 
communication advises guided by opinion pollsters train politicians to mime 
sincerity and play at conviction. 
 
The consequences for political life of this preoccupation with ‘evidence’ and the role 
played by government agencies in developing a ‘politics of fear’ (Furedi 2006) is 
suggested when we recall the widespread sense that we now face unique new 
threats to our security.6  The practical consequences of this as Agamben (1999; 
                                                 
6 If public opinion polls are to be believed for example, many Australians believe that the world is not 
a safe place anymore and we need to defend ourselves from terrorists intent on destroying ‘the 
Australian way of life’ or attacking ‘the West’. Many Australians appear to accept that they are 
engaged in a ‘war against terror’ waged by ‘radical’ or ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims that began with the 
9/11 attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. Australia joined with the USA and Britain in a 
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2004) has argued, include moves by western states to suspend the rule of law and 
create states of exceptionality (involving the reintroduction of state-sanctioned 
torture (Danner 2007). The means by which fear is manufactured has been superbly 
documented by Marr and Wilkinson (2006) in their forensic account of the 
systematic exercise orchestrated by the Howard government in September 2001 to 
mislead the Australian people about the rationale for their handling of the request 
by the MV. Tampa to transfer a number of asylum seekers they had rescued from a 
sinking boat.   
 
Marr and Wilkinson remind us of what is at stake. In this case the Howard 
government’s use of ostensibly ‘objective’ images of babies apparently being thrown 
overboard, help to frame a sharp question or two about the nature of evidence and 
the  capacity of seemingly objective things like photographic images to deceive or 
mislead. Here Daston’s and Gallison’s (2008) account of the history of the idea of 
‘objectivity’ and the variety of practices said to generate or guarantee it, points if 
nothing else to the problematic authority vested in photographic techniques as a 
guarantee of what they call  ‘mechanical objectivity’).  
 
This line of enquiry insists that we think more and better about the relationship 
between politics and truth.       
                                                                                                                                           
‘Coalition of the Willing’ first in an invasion of Afghanistan in 2002 and then of Iraq in March 2004 
apparently to prevent Iraq using its arsenal of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ against the West. In 
August 2005 an A.C. Nielsen poll showed that 70 % of Australians expected a terrorist attack in 
Australia in the ‘next few years’. In January 2006 one news poll had 87 percent of those surveyed 
fearful about terrorism.  FOXTEL TV news polls in August 2005 and again at the end of 1007 suggested 
that more than between 80 percent  and 90 percent of Australians were prepared to relinquish most 
of our civil liberties in order to have stronger security laws.  
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If the contemporary ‘politics of fear’ works by conjuring up ‘evidence’ of states of 
affairs that are not quite what they seem, then there are no less interesting 
questions about how it is possible that robust evidence that something is there is 
ignored. Our own interest in Australian social policy provides rich material for 
reflecting on this problem. The salience of this is suggested for example when 
recalling as has been noted on more than one occasion, how it is possible that a 
social problem like ‘poverty’ continues to be ‘discovered’ or ‘rediscovered’ from time 
to time even as relevant evidence is systematically repressed or simply ignored.   
 
The actual regard for evidence and its capacity to function as it is supposed to do, 
that is as a source of rational persuasion is put into a strange new light when we look 
at recent policy research  that has informed Australian welfare policy development.  
This case subverts any conventional thinking about the value of evidence.  Indeed 
this case suggests that evidence that contradicts what is already ‘known’ and widely 
believed to be the case is strongly to the fore in the sad and sorry history of 
Australian welfare policy. This seems to have one general aspect and one, more 
specific feature  
 
On the one hand it seems that generally our policy community has not been all that 
able or willing to puzzle sufficiently well about the strange capacity to keep on 
(re)‘discovering’ ‘poverty’.  
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The notion of 'rediscovery' certainly overstates both the novelty and the status of 
these recurrent discoveries. In Australia for example there is a record of persistent 
research effort undertaken since the mid-1960s into poverty (Encel 1988; 1990; 
Sitsky 1989).  This (re)discovery' raises some basic questions about the social and 
political significance of income inequality research in contemporary Australian social 
policy. That there is a point to 'problematising' seemingly 'obvious' processes of 
discovery such as this, was first raised in Australia by Geoff Sharp.  At the height of 
an earlier 'rediscovery' of poverty in Australia, Sharp (1974) suggested: 
... it has sometimes been noted that such rediscoveries [of poverty] recur 
periodically.  The clear implication is that the object of discovery has no 
neutrally independent existence, but has a good deal to do with ethical and 
social imperatives that find expression through the eye of the observer ... At 
least initially the emphasis [here] is on why it is being observed and how it 
comes about that what was previously hidden can be discovered or 
rediscovered now. 
Sharp then posed the question we need to revisit:  
....  [W]hy should we assume that 'the truth' of the existence of poverty is any 
less ambiguous than the earlier assumption that it 'was no longer with us'?  
(Sharp 1974: 194) 
In effect Sharp is insisting that if it is legitimate to enquire into the distribution of 
income and the processes that produce poverty, along with the methods for doing 
this, it is equally legitimate to enquire into the social processes involved in this 
research and 'discovery' process and their consequent impact on policy 
development.  Here there are many complex issues arising out of the relationship 
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between reality, our knowledge of it and practical interventions like those which 
take place as policy-makers intervene.  
 
The second and related proposition that goes to the question of the evidence basis 
of modern welfare policy is suggested when we consider again how what Furedi 
(2005) calls ‘the fear of politics’ has successfully invoked the idea that ordinary 
decent taxpaying Australians have a lot to fear from something called the 
‘underclass’ a large group of ‘welfare dependent’ spongers. Bessant (1995) recalls 
the role played by some social scientists, including self-declared progressives in 
promoting the idea that we should fear welfare beneficiaries, This politics of fear has 
helped to drive an evolving regime of income support based on stigmatizing 
categories hyper-surveillance and disciplinary procedures.   In that context the most 
recent phase in the evolution of Australia’s experiment in the ‘welfare-to-work’ 
legislation that took effect back on 1 July 2006, gives practical expression to the idea 
we need to fear single mothers, the long-term unemployed or people with 
disabilities. 
 
There is of course an old provenance to the idea that there are plenty of people out 
there who are going to take advantage of ‘us’. This fear has propelled governments 
to sweep up single parents, older age unemployed and people with serious 
disabilities and chronic illnesses, and take them off their current typically more 
generous benefits (eg., Single Parent Supporting Benefits or Disability Support 
Pensions) and  locate them in the far meaner regime of surveillance and activity 
testing associated with Newstart Allowance. 
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Of course this is not a new policy. It is a policy that has its antecedents in policy 
processes that began over 20 years ago (Bessant, Watts et al 2006).  The waves of 
Howard government ‘welfare reforms’ were but one of a series of social security 
‘reforms’ going back to the so-called ‘active society’ model first spelled out by the 
OECD Social policy secretariat ca., 1984-6. The Howard government ‘reforms’ simply  
built on the work of its ALP predecessors beginning with the trialing of a ‘work-for-
the-dole’ scheme in 1997 followed by another major review process producing the 
McClure report of 2001 which spelled out the ‘new’ doctrine of  ‘mutual obligation’.  
 
Central to that doctrine as it had been central to the welfare reform process 
stretching back to the mid-1980s was the core belief that what had once been a 
problem of ‘unemployment’ had become a ‘problem of ‘the unemployed’.  This 
policy process has relied on assiduously promoting the US style critique of the core 
category of ‘welfare’ which permitted the representation of the problem as the 
‘problem’ of ‘welfare dependency’. “Welfare dependency’ became the modern way 
of talking about the persistence of a class historically referred to as  ‘paupers’ and 
later as the ‘undeserving poor’. ‘Welfare dependency’ creates unsustainable fiscal 
burdens on hard working taxpayers. According to this narrative ‘welfare 
dependency’  led to life in an ‘underclass’ of loafers, criminals, addicts, and the 
mentally ill. It is the very expression of anti-social disorder and immorality.  This 
move relied on social science-based representations of unemployed and low income 
people as different from ‘ordinary Australians’ and possibly even a threat to our 
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economy and certainly to the ethical order that the regime of wage work had for so 
long served to embody and  to secure.  
 
Our point is simply this: There is of course plenty of evidence to show that this 
portrait is simply mistaken as eg., Peel(2003) argues. The most significant  evidence 
is the empirical survey undertaken by the then-Department of Family and 
Community Services (DFACS).  This was research work done to support the McClure 
Committee established in 1999 to make recommendations on ‘welfare reform’ to 
the Howard government. This research undertaken in 1999-2000 surveyed a large 
number of  income  beneficiaries.  It was buried in a technical appendix to the 
Interim Report of the McClure Committee released early in 2000 and was available 
only on-line. 
 
This substantial body of data on the characteristics of Australian income support 
beneficiaries showed that in terms of labour market participation or civic 
engagement ‘they’ were no different from ‘us’ ordinary Australians. This evidence, 
buried in a Technical Appendix to the McClure Interim Report was not allowed to 
stymie the official view that the essential problem was the problem vested in the 
character and life style of welfare beneficiaries which sustained the problem of 
‘welfare dependence’. On this occasion the evidence had to be repressed and 
prevented form affecting the outcome of the policy process.  
 
In effect on this occasion this use of evidence is properly the other bookend to the 
case of the evidence alleging Iraq’s possession of WMD. In the case of WMD there 
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was no possibility of there being evidence for the existence of WMD in Iraq. So in the 
case for WMD the evidence was invented or as Campbell (2007) allowed it was  
‘sexed’ up.  In the case of welfare reform the opposite problem confronting the 
relevant government was that the  evidence generated for the McClure Committee 
directly contradicted what the government and indeed the McClure committee 
already knew. It had to be repressed  
 
In effect this juxtaposition of spin and evidence raises in alarming fashion certain 
problems of ‘political practice’ and what we might properly call here the ‘politics of 
truth’.  One good way of establishing what the problem is begins by establishing 
what the evidence on evidence tells us.  
 
That  on the one hand government agencies  found  evidence for WMD in Iraq (when 
there were none) and that on the other hand government agencies repressed 
evidence that Australian welfare beneficiaries were no different from the broader 
Australian community, reminds  us that  policy-making communities are no less 
immune than the rest of us  to believing what we already know to be the case and 
looking for the evidence to sustain these beliefs or else work to repress evidence 
that contradicts what we already know to be the case.  That this is so  reflects at 
least basic problems.    
 
THE PROBLEM WITH EVIDENCE  
There are two essential problems with evidence, one to do with the nature of reality 
the other with the thin capacity of evidence to inform what we think,  know,  believe 
 33 
or do.  
 
One goes to the fundamental interplay between what we can call ‘reality’ and the 
various modes of knowing it. While various positivists, empiricists and social science 
methodologists insist there is no problem here, there is no easy way of getting 
around a number of difficult problems. Most recently courtesy of Anne-Marie Mol 
(2002) and John Law (2004) have reminded us that speaking as it were ontologically,  
reality is messy.  
 
In spelling this proposition out a bit more (and lest it be thought that we are about 
to launch a post-modernist version of the ‘there-is-no-reality-out-there’ kind) we 
need to make it plain that that there are definite processes, relationships, physical 
things  and kinds of practices and ways of life that are ‘out there’ waiting to be  to be 
discovered. Rather the point to be made as John Law (2004: 6) puts it, is the problem 
that whatever is out there, is not just going to generate technically complications 
that get in the way of us knowing ‘stuff’, but that the world out there necessarily  
exceeds our capacity to know it.  
 
Anne-Marie Mol (2002) provides an exemplary case study of why and how this is so 
in the case of the very serious disease called atherosclerosis.  Atherosclerosis is the 
extremely common and all too real medical condition that we might understand as a 
bad case of ‘blocked arteries’.  It is a disease produced by combinations of factors 
including bad genes, poor diet, the aging process, too much cholesterol, lack of 
exercise, diabetes, and hypertension.  It can cause pain, disability, organ failure, 
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strokes, heart attacks, vascular disease, gangrene and death.  Mol (2002) offers an 
exemplary study of one version of this disease called lower limb atherosclerosis. Her 
point is simple. The same all too-real disease does not produce the same symptoms 
in each patient and the variety of diagnostic techniques including ultra-sound, 
palpation, PET Scans angiograms and autopsies of amputated  limbs or the whole 
and very dead body all demonstrate varying degrees of utility in diagnosing the scale 
of illness and informing appropriate treatments. In some patients with precisely the 
same  level of arterial blockage there will be excruciating leg pain (or intermittent 
claudication) while those other patients with the same degree of blockage report no  
such pain. The variations in the way the disease manifests and the variation in 
diagnostic capacity are a striking and simple example of the general point: whatever 
is meant by an ‘out-there reality’ it does not exist in a singular or coherent way.  ‘It’ 
ie.,  reality is inherently  or to put it simply it is ontologically messy. 
 
The problem is that for a very long time lots of people I what can loosely be called 
the European philosophical tradition have presumed  to treat reality in a number of 
ways that add up to a ‘metaphysics of presence’ and that are not helpful.  Law (2004: 
24) points to some of the key problematic ontological assumptions -including the 
premises of ‘out-thereness’, ‘independence’, ‘anteriority’, ‘definiteness’ and 
‘singularity’. Law (2004:30) explicates these assumptions simply. Firstly there is the 
premise that there is a reality and that ‘it’ is ‘out there’ beyond us. Secondly reality is 
assumed to be independent of our actions and especially of our perceptions.   
Thirdly reality precedes us.  Then and more crucially reality is deemed to be 
constituted out of definite relations and forms such that it only exists in ‘this’ form 
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and not in ‘that’ form. Perhaps most crucially given these assumptions, the 
metaphysicians of presence have assumed that reality is the same everywhere or 
that is common.  That is, it is or has a  singular and coherent status or character  and 
is the same everywhere because of its out-thereness’, ‘independence’, ‘anteriority’ 
and ‘definiteness’.   
 
As Law (2004: 31) notes each of these assumptions need to be treated with plenty of 
nuance and the frequent use of a phrase when determining the extent to which 
these assumptions are credible with a phrase like ‘it all depends’.  Law insists the 
implications of this rethinking the nature of reality imply that we may need to value 
a much large number of ‘research methods’. This is because it matters that we 
somehow get the relationship between the world and what we do in it in reasonable 
alignment What we know and the adequacy of what we know is   linked to the quite 
pressing need to act in a world and to do so in ways that benefit or help us live well 
rather than killing or harming us.  
 
If we shift our focus away from the ‘ontological’ to the actual; ways we use evidence  
then we confront another equally alarming problem.  For the other no-less 
fundamental problem is suggested by abundant evidence gathered over the past half 
century or so by social psychologists and communications researchers, that the 
authority and value long vested in the idea of evidence-based rational persuasion is 
strikingly compromised by what we know about ‘cognitive dissonance’ and 
‘groupthink’.  
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It can be recalled that Leon Festinger (1957) used the idea of ‘cognitive dissonance’ 
to name the problem confronting members of a UFO doomsday cult persuaded by  
its leader (who had received telepathic messages from the Guardians who flew 
around in UFOs) that the world would end on a certain day and time.  When the 
anticipated cataclysm failed to eventuate, the cult and their leader faced the 
problem of ‘cognitive dissonance’.  (Here the general idea of ‘cognition’/’cognitive’ 
refers to a number of things including evidentiary knowledge, attitude, feelings, 
belief, self-identity and behavior:  any or all of these elements can come into 
conflict). As Festinger suggested the cult members faced the issue of what to do 
when a prophesy fails.   He suggested that they had a few options open to them 
including ignoring the dissonant evidence (ie.,  the world had not ended) or to add 
new consonant evidence. (On this occasion cognitive dissonance was resolved when 
the leader announced that she had received a ‘telepathic message’ from the 
Guardians explaining  that her cult had done so much good work in preaching the 
message that God had spared the world).   
   
Since Festinger’s original research there has been a lot of research effort put into 
exploring the very complex ways people select and use evidence-based information 
to inform their views of the world, to make judgments or to act. Janis’ (1984) 
account of the role played by what he called ‘groupthink’ in six major American 
foreign policy catastrophes merely anticipates and indeed may go some way to 
explain current catastrophes like the invasion of Iraq. As Janis shows in some detail 
groups charged with policy making routinely ignore evidence that does not confirm 
what they already know or want to do an use group processes to silence critics.    
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The crucial  insight from what is now a very large body of evidence is that the 
relationship of evidence, emotions and our being in the world is less likely to 
promote a regard for evidence based-knowledge and activity. It is far morel likely to 
give us cause to avoid information because it distresses us, or because it increases 
our anxiety or else is simply unacceptable because it contradicts what we already 
know, believe or prefer. Alternatively we simply select the evidence that supports 
our existing views and press on doing what we want to do 
 
Writers like Janis (1953) through to Damasio (2007) have done much to subvert the 
rationalist premise that humans rely only on rational cognitive processes when they 
form beliefs, make judgments or act. There is evidence that one of the most 
important factors that guide people to accept statements as true is the source of the 
idea: it seems that most us prefer to trust  information that comes directly from 
other people (eg., Johnson 1997; Rintal &  Real 2003).    Then as Maslow (1963: 111) 
suggested, we seem to be trapped between ‘a need to know and a fear of knowing’.  
Evidence from the study of public health campaigns designed to get people to 
change their behaviour (like anti-skin cancer or ‘quit smoking’ campaigns) suggest 
that evidence-based marketing campaigns produce complex reactions and are as 
likely to  lead to avoidance of the evidence as to any desired  change in behaviour 
(O’Keefe 1990). That is, the evidence suggest that more of us are more likely to seek 
out evidence that helps reduce uncertainty or to accept untrue statements that 
support what we already believe rather than accept or seek out  evidence that is 
accurate or true  but that controverts something we know already or that may 
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induce anxiety or stress (Kulthau 1993).  Finally there is abundant  research evidence 
which suggests that  people screen out evidence or arguments with which they 
disagree and/or  screen in evidence and arguments with which they agree or else 
use their preferences for one political candidate to accept as true evidence or 
political marketing material  which support a candidate  (Iyengar et al 2008).   
 
Much about this body of research resists easy compression or generalisation but it 
does seem to suggest inter alia that 'evidence' largely works in one way ie.,  it works 
to reinforce views, theories, self perceptions  and beliefs already held, while any 
strongly dissonant evidence is either rejected or else simply further entrenches 
views/beliefs facts already believed to be true.  
 
THINKING, JUDGING AND ACTING POLITICALLY: HEIDEGGER 
 
Though it may seem a bit of a stretch to link this highly empiricist and quantitative 
tradition of research with the often esoteric and ‘difficult’ tradition of theory 
associated with Heidegger (1962) there are at least two fundamental  points of 
contact between the evidence against evidence and the work of Heidegger.  On the 
one hand Heidgegger’s often forbiddingly abstract account of our being in the world, 
and the work of later generations of theorists of practice  opens up large questions 
about the complex ways we live in think, judge  and act in the world. Heidegger is 
important because of his commitment to thinking against the preoccupation with 
methodology and foundationalist models of scientism which have provided one 
dominant motif in modern philosophy and the social sciences.  The second is his  
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account of   how we come to form our  understanding of the world in the context of 
our being (Sein)  in the world (Dasein) and in the context of our habits and forms of 
practice into which we are largely unconsciously habituated.  
 
If Heidegger is rightly acknowledged as perhaps the single most influential 
philosopher of the twentieth century as Guignon (2006: 1-2), for example suggests, 
then we need to be able to say why this is the case. Recalling that Heidegger’s 
influence is evident in the work of such varied figures for example as Sartre, 
Gadamer, Arendt, Geertz, Rorty, Taylor, T.S. Kuhn, Foucault, Manent, Latour and 
Bourdieu points to certain key propositions with which they started and which 
Heidegger provided.   
 
At the risk of over-simplifying matters -but in the interests of a needful compression 
what has been called the ‘hermeneutic turn’ begins with Heidegger’s rejection of 
what Frede (2006: 42) calls ‘substance ontology’. That is Heidegger calls out a long-
standing premise which links the earliest of philosophers like Plato through to  
classical physicists, namely the idea that there is an underlying  and enduring 
‘presence’: this is as Guignon (2006; 4) points out, what links Plato’s Forms, 
Aristotle’s ‘primary substances’, Descartes’ res extensa, Kant’s noumena or Newton’s 
grounding his physics in objective time, space and gravity into a persistent  
‘metaphysics of presence’. However it also generates a series of puzzling binaries 
which philosophers have endlessly and fruitlessly tried to resolve through debate: at 
stake are the merits of mind/matter, idealism/realism, facts/values or 
objectivism/subjectivism. Heidegger undercut this tradition by focusing on ‘being’ 
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(Sein) and in particular on the way humans actually live out their Dasein or ‘being 
there’ ie., the ways we live our lives in specific historical life-worlds  a state of being.  
Our being there comes before our will to theorize and abstract starts to  take us 
away from that state of being, Heidegger’s ‘new’  ontology focused instead on the 
very conditions of intelligibility or understanding  whereby we come to be in the 
world and do so by engaging in  constant, intelligible pre-theoretical  practice 
beginning with our use of language.   
 
Heidegger’s project began with his recalling the ways we live in the midst of our 
practical day-to-day activities before we have learned to split mind and matter. This 
involves him in rejecting any idea of achieving or finding a pure or neutral point of 
view form which we can gaze in on ourselves by adopting what Manent has called 
the spectator view advocated by successive realists, naturalist and positivists. Rather 
Heidegger insists that we start with our own ‘life-world’ and the ways this 
‘embeddedness’ in a world of practice enables us to engage  intelligibly in the world. 
Hence Heidegger’s famous interest in  mundane practices like  turning a doorknob or  
hammering away in a workshop. This it should be noted in no way sanctions a 
retreat into any kind of complacent common sense: rather Heidegger insists on the 
need to interrogate the fundamentally tragic unfolding of our lives between the 
moments of our birth and death: Our being in time adds an uncomfortable  
indeterminacy  since as Heidegger puts it ‘My being –who I am – is nothing other 
than what unfolds in the course of  my life’.  Our agency is constantly at stake as we 
seek to  understand  a life which is lived forwards but only on the basis of 
understanding backwards even as we live forwards: this is a life lived on the edge  of 
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an ‘abyss’ (or Abgrund ie., an absence of ground).  There is no way out of this 
‘hermeneutic circle’ and certainly methodological escape hatch.  Philosophers may 
have dreamed of finding a  secure vantage point from which to get at reality ‘as it 
really is’ but there is  no escaping the ‘hermeneutic circle’  The search for constants, 
regularities  and predictive certainties is a chimera undone by our radical 
‘situatedness’ in time - which for all of us eventually runs out.  As Guignon (2006: 11) 
puts it:  
… though our  general sense of things depend on  what we encounter in the 
world, we can first discover something as significant … only because we have  
soaked up a ‘preontological  understanding’ of how things in general can 
count, through being initiated into the practices and language of our  culture.       
 
In short the ‘hermeneutic turn’ involves the rejection of abstracted (natural) 
scientific rationality as the only or best source of cognitive and evaluative authority. 
It also sanctions a resolute rejection of an undue preoccupation with epistemological 
questions and certain abstracted  theoretical criteria for determining what is 
‘rational’. It begins with the idea that what we know and do is grounded in and made 
possible by our entry into an historical community of practice -beginning with our 
immersion in a pre-given linguistic and conceptual worldview or field of discourse.  
As Gadamer (1994)  who deepened Heidegger’s account in useful ways argued 
insisted we confront a diversity of ways of knowing, grounded in what he called our 
historical nature including certain fundamental intellectual or disciplinary  prejudices  
or what Gerald Holton (1984) called themata which are at work in all the variety of 
modes of human cognition and practice from art and poetry to physics and 
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mathematics. An important entailment of this framework is the proposition that 
whatever gets to be selected or counted as evidence depends on these themata.     
 
Hopefully enough has been said here about the ontology of being (and mindful of 
the notoriously abstracted and ‘difficult’ language Heidegger invented to talk about 
this),  we can  see what is at stake here for any account of politics and policy-making. 
The evidence on evidence suggests that evidence works in two ways:  either to 
persuade people of what they already know/believe to be the case or else to 
persuade them that they evidence presented to them which contradicts what they 
already /know believe must be rejected and or confirms them they are already 
possessed of a true belief or accurate knowledge. Heidegger’s ‘hermeneutic turn’ 
points to the power of our life world and the habits and practices that dispose us to 
think, act and feel in certain ways.  Yet we are still faced with basic questions and 
problems that link what we know and think to what we do. How do we do this? One 
of the essential points of linkage here is the obvious fit between a conception of 
reality as inherently messy (Law 2004) outlined above, a conception of the value 
however limited it may be of applied research and the need to live and make do in 
an inherently messy world filled with a plurality of ethical ideas, and practices and 
ways of knowing.  At stake here is the practical and ethical problem of how to link 
theory/knowledge and politics/policy.  One way forward has been suggested by 
Arendt (2005) and Flyvbjerg (2004) who have argued for good judgment -or 
phronesis.    
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The recovery of an interest in phronesis a concept developed by Aristotle, has been 
underway since the recovery of virtue ethics in the 1970s  (eg., Anscombe 1968; 
MacIntyre 1986) and as  Arendt (2005) absorbed it into her theory of the political 
and as it has  been promoted subsequently by Nussbaum (1986) and Flyvbjerg 
(2004) as a framework for contemporary policy and professional practice.    
Aristotle (1975) understood phronesis as a basic human virtue (ie., as something we 
can aim at being excellent at). The idea of  good judgment (phronesis) Aristotle 
understood as a particular kind of  practical intellectual virtue: that is, knowing how 
to act in specific situations.  As such it is something we can be socialised or trained 
in, just as we can practice it and get better at it. Good judgment relies on practice, 
for as Damasio (2006, xix) observes, it: 
 …depends on how well we have reasoned in the past; on how well we have 
classified the events of our past experiences in relation to the emotions that 
preceded and followed them; and also on how well we have reflected on the 
successes and failure of our past intuitions. '  
Good judgment involves an orientation or disposition to act truthfully and with 
reason in the practice of deliberation and is oriented to practical action in which 
some conception of the good is at stake.  It is best understood by reference to 
Aristotle’s (1975: 1139a; pp. 27-8; 1178b pp. 20-22) threefold distinction between 
ways of being or acting in the world.  Firstly there is theoresis (involving profound 
concentrated contemplation a little akin to meditation); then there is poiesis 
(involving production or world making) and finally there is praxis or social action   
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Each of these ways of being and acting in the world is linked to a kind of knowledge 
there is episteme theoretike (or theoretical knowledge achieved by various styles of 
valid reasoning);   there is techne (or technical skill) involving  a trained capacity for 
action and finally there is phronesis  or practical wisdom.  Each of these are different 
yet complementary capacities and ways of knowing and being in the world.     
Translated into present-day language good judgment refers to a practical wisdom 
that is more than simply knowing about principles of action. Good judgment refers 
to a practitioner having the wisdom that come though experience to make good 
judgment and to know how and when to act in ways that will promote the basic 
goods.  Good judgment refers to an ability on the part of the practitioner to know 
when and in what ways to act courageously, honestly, or generously. It refers to the 
ability to know how and why what might be an act of courage in one context is high 
risk or reckless in another. This means being both context sensitive and able to judge 
what the right measure of an action is. (Arostotle spoke often about a golden mean” 
think of a virtue like ‘courage’.  Too little is the vice of ‘cowardice’ too much is the 
vice of foolhardiness.  
To speak about the pursuit of goods reinstates a proper regard for knowledge. To 
say how we may think about good judgement entails accepting first that knowledge 
is a fundamental and universal human good. John Finnis (1980) provides one of the 
most compelling modern accounts of the nature of knowledge as a good using a kind 
of analytic dialectic which moves backwards and forwards between assessments of 
human good  and its practical requirements and explanatory descriptions using 
historical, experimental, and sociological materials  and methods. This good he  
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(1980: 60) says, is grounded in a very common human activity, namely the ‘activity 
of trying to find out, to understand  and to judge matters correctly’. As he (1980: 61) 
puts it:  
Commonly one’s interest in knowledge, in getting to the truth of the matter, is 
not bounded by the particular questions that first aroused one’s desire to find 
out … In explaining, to oneself and others, what one is up to,  one finds oneself 
able and ready to refer to finding out, knowledge, truth as sufficient 
explanations of the point of one’s activity, project or commitment.  One finds 
oneself reflecting that ignorance and muddle are to be avoided … ‘it’s good to 
find out…’ now seems to be applicable not merely in relation to oneself … but 
at large …  and for anyone.   
Finnis (1980: 65) proposes that knowledge is a human good and there are no 
sufficient reasons for doubting that this is the case. He allows that the truth of this 
claim ‘cannot be demonstrated, but then it needs no demonstration’.  It is simply 
self-evident. Or rather as Finnis (1980: 74-5)  proceeds to suggest, any scepticism 
about the basic value of knowledge is  self-defeating or self-nullifying. 
 
The second basic idea is that phronesis is a deeply practical capacity.  Those who 
work in this tradition stress the need to be good at practical deliberation addressing 
the question ‘what ought I do in this case?’  This question necessarily arises in the 
contexts of our daily lives with other people. An orientation to phronesis  suggests 
that addressing and answering ethical questions has less to do with philosophical 
analysis and much more to do with being a good person  who can in each 
circumstance try to exercise good judgment. 
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It is against this backdrop that Arendt’s relentless attempt to specify what it is that 
marks out politics as our highest accomplishment and the challenge it daily poses to 
think well and to do well takes its salience.  The need to do so arises in Arendt’s mind 
(2005: 93-5) from the fact of difference between us ie., the fact of human plurality 
This means for her that there is no human essence and no essence of politics: 
politics is what arises between men.   On the one hand she notes the inevitability of 
prejudices which constitute our life world  
The prejudices that we share, that we take to be self evident, that we toss out  
in conversation are… political in the broadest sense of the word, that is, 
something  that constitutes  an integral part of those human affairs  that are 
the context  in which we go about our daily lives. That prejudices play such a 
large role in daily life and therefore in politics  is not something that we should 
bemoan as such, or for that matter attempt to change … men cannot live 
without prejudices…(Arendt 205: 99)     
(As she notes to attempt to overcome all our prejudices would require ‘a 
superhuman alertness’)  Equally the task of politics involves distinguishing between 
genuine prejudices and acknowledging the requirements of good judgment: our 
substitution of prejudice for judgment becomes dangerous only if it spreads into the 
political realm where we cannot function at all without judgement(2005:101).  The 
practice of judgment relies in her luminous phrase on developing both our capacity 
and will  ‘to think what we do’. 
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Arendt’s phenomenology of thinking reveals its relentlessly dissolvent qualities.   Her 
famous account of Adolph Eichmann (Arendt 1963) suggested not that there is an 
Eichmann in each of us, but rather that there is a general atrophy of our powers of 
judgement, an inability to think without rules.  Thinking entails a capacity to judge 
moral and political matters and then to take appropriate action. This inability to 
judge is associated with an increasing reliance on ready-to-hand principles and 
organisational practices that seek to enable us to navigate  everyday life without 
having to  stop and think.   That is, we adopt an automatic pilot view of what we 
need to think or do ie., an everyday thoughtlessness. The faculty of judgement the 
ability to tell right from wrong is dependent on the ability to think well. As Arendt 
(2005)  and Vlastos (1992)  remind us this is the value of Socrates. Socrates show us 
how to think representing the ability to make public in discourse the thinking 
process – the dialogue that soundlessly goes on within me between me and myself.  
Thinking produces uncertainty and in this way thinking  inevitably has an 
undermining  effect on all established criteria,  values principles and unthinking 
customs and prejudices.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The implication of this discussion for a consideration of the current enthusiasm for 
evidence-based policy is simple. Thinking well trumps evidence:  the practice of good 
judgment comes prior to the mindless conviction that anything can be measured. 
While evidence based policy may be a  boon to any number of university-based 
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researchers we need to exercise  a duty of care to think about the effect of this not 
least of all on universities.    
 
In a spirit of provocation we think Susan Haack (1999) is right to point to the 
prevalence of several unacceptable kinds of research. Like Haack we assume that 
there are major problems when we tolerate sham research and fake research.  If we 
have a proper regard for the value of good public scholarship we will not readily 
tolerate the defence of sham research or fake research by appealing to notions of 
academic freedom.  
 
Though this is a proposition itself requiring inquiry to render persuasive, we think 
too much of what currently passes for university based research is either ‘sham 
inquiry’ or ‘fake inquiry’ (See Haack 1999: 189-92).  
 
Sham inquiry tries to make a case for the truth of a proposition which is 
evidence and argument-proof. The sham inquirer is not primarily concerned to 
find out how things really are but to make a case for some immovably held 
preconceived belief. ‘Fake inquiry’ on the other hand  tries to make a case for 
the truth of some proposition advancing which s/he believes will benefit him 
or herself, but to the truth value  of which s/he is indifferent.  
The corrosive effect of insisting on gathering and  using evidence to evaluate the 
effectiveness of universities eg.,  by measuring research quality has been well 
represented by Susan Haack. A genuine inquirer, says Haack (1999: 190): 
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 … is motivated to  get to the truth of the matter that concerns him, he is 
motivated to seek out and assess the worth of evidence and arguments 
thoroughly… it is a matter of  willingness to  rethink, to reappraise, to spend as 
long as it takes on the picky detail that might just be fatal, to give as much 
thought to the final one percent as to the rest.  
This is why as she goes on to say it matters that that the space in which  inquiry is 
carried out supports and rewards real inquiry.  Her checklist of the things that mark 
out such an environment speaks to the current capacity of universities to support 
genuine inquiry. She (1999: 194) tells of a recent request for a reference for a junior 
colleague in a British university: 
Though the job was described as a lectureship it was made very clear that 
teaching ability wasn’t important, that the main qualification for the position 
was  that the person appointed should publish a sufficient number of papers in 
sufficiently prestigious  journals as to raise the department’s standing in the 
governments  ‘research ranking’…     
This is what Jacques Barzun called ‘preposterism’. ‘Preposterism’ is the practice 
which  
… puts the last first  and the first last  e.g., Valuing knowledge we preposterize 
the idea  and say … everybody shall produce written research in order to live 
and it shall be decreed a knowledge explosion  
As Haack (1999: 194) insists adapting to a culture of  grants-and-research projects 
has:  
…tended to  lower the motive with which [research]  work is done: it has  
fostered an environment  hospitable to sham and fake  inquiry. The culture of 
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grants-and-research projects and the conception of productivity and efficiency 
that culture fosters  discourage  candid acknowledgment that you may work 
for  years at what turns out to be a dead end  and constitute standing 
encouragement  to exaggeration,  half truth and  outright dishonesty about 
what you have achieved. … Inevitably intellectual honesty is eroded. 
That is why preserving the capacity of language to tell the truth and to practice 
politics requires that engage in this practice of judgment and thinking well ourselves.   
Let us suppose then that there ought to be a close link between politics good 
judgment and truth telling. As Don Watson (2002:48) has insisted we live now in a 
political community that has cut the basic thread of truth and trust. In his great 
essay, ‘Politics and the English language’, George Orwell thought about the political 
role played by language in establishing the fundamental conditions of trust and 
truth. Orwell held that truth in language use established the very conditions of trust 
and understanding between people, qualities fundamental to the quality of people’s 
lives and relationships and to the ‘health’ of any civil society (See Shapin 1996 for an 
elucidation of the etymological links between ‘truth’ and ‘trust’). 
 
Orwell argued that language should function so as ‘not to anaesthetize a portion of 
one’s brain’ but that it should carry the capacity to perform or express our capacity 
for clear thinking. ‘To think clearly is to a necessary first step towards political 
regeneration’. Equally he showed how a lack of regard for truth in language 
permitted everything from petty tyrannies to the political catastrophes unleashed by 
totalitarian political formations.  Upon this basis it is possible to envisage a language 
practice which keeps intact, in Don Watsons’ (2002:48) words, ’the threads of a 
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common sensibility which join the people to their representatives and institutions’. 
This formulation speaks precisely to the current state of our public culture, its 
instiutions and to the activities we should expect of our politicians and policy-makers 
no less than our teachers, writers, scientists and artists.  
 
REFERENCES 
ABS, 2010,  A Guide for Using  Statistics for  Evidence based policy, ABS Cat. No. 1500.0,  Canberra.   
Agamben, G., 2005, States of Exception (Trans.  K. Attell), University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Agamben, G., Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Arendt, H., 1958, The Human Condition, Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, New York. 
Arendt, H., 1968, ‘Truth and Politics’,  in Between Past and Future, Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 
New York.  
Arendt, H., 1975, The Life of the Mind, Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, New York. 
Arendt, H., 2005, The Promise of Politics,   (ed J., Kohn), Schocken, New York   
Argyrous, G., 2009, ‘Evidence for policy and decision-Making: A Practical Guide’,   Public Organisation 
Review,  vol.10 (2),  191-4. 
Aristotle, 1975, Ethica Nichomachea,  (Vol IX), The Works of Aristotle,  Oxford University Press, 
Oxford,  
Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2002, Introducing the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children, 
[Online], Available: http://www.aifs.gov.au/lsac/pubs.html [2002, May 16]. 
Australian Public Service Commission, 2007, Tackling Wicked Problems A Public policy perspective, 
APSC, Canberra   
Ballard, J.G,. 2007, Kingdom Come, Fourth Estate, London.  
Banks, G.,  2009, Challenges of Evidence-based  Policy making, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Banks, G., 2009,  Evidence based policy making: What is it? How do we get it? Productivity 
Commission ANU Public Lecture Series, ANZSOG, Canberra February     
Beresford, Q., 1998,  Selling democracy short: Elections in the age of the market. Current Affairs 
Bulletin, Vol. 74, No. 5, pp. 24-32. 
Bernays E., 1928, Propoganda, Horace Liverwright, New York.  
Bessant, J., 1995, ‘The Discovery of a Juvenile ‘Underclass’,  ANZJS,  vol36, (2) 55-72 
Bessant, J., Watts, R., Dalton, T., & Smyth, P., 2006, Talking Policy: How Social Policy is Made. Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney.  
Bevir, M.,  and Rhodes, R., 2003, Interpreting British Government, Routledge London. Blair,T., 1997, 
Labour Party Manifesto for the 1997 General Election,  
Bishop R., 2007.  The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Continuum, New York. 
Bloor, D., 1991, Knowledge and Social Imagery,  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago  
Bourdieu, P., 2008, Political Interventions: Social science and Political Action, Verso, London. 
Brown, W., 2010, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty  Zone Books, Cam bridge.  
Cabinet Office, 1999a, Modernising Government White Paper, Cm 4310, Cabinet  Office, London,    
Cabinet Office, 1999b, Professional Policy Making for the Twenty first century: A report by the 
Strategic Policy Management Team, Cabinet Office, London. 
Calhoun, C., 1992, (ed),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Campbell, A., 2007, The Campbell Diaries, Random House, London.   
Cappella, J. N. and Jamieson, K.  1997, Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good, Oxford 
University Press, New York.  
Cartwright, N.,  2009, ‘Evidence –based policy: What’s to be done about relevance? 
 52 
Centrelink 2002, Centrelink's 2002-2005 Business Plan, [Online], Available: http: 
www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/filestores/pr108_0207/$file/pr1008_0207en.pdf 
[2002, Jan. 17] 
Certeau, M. de 1988 The Practice of Everyday Life, UCLA Press,  Berkeley. 
Coalition for Evidence Based Policy 2000, Mission and Agenda, [Online], Available: 
www.exelgov.org/performance/evidence/execsumm.htm 
Cook, F. 2001, Evidence-based policy making in a democracy: exploring the role of policy research in 
conjunction with politics and public opinion, paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September, 2, 
2001.  
Damasion, A., 2007, Descartes’ Error, (2nd ed) Grosset-Putnam, New York.  
Daston, L., & Gallison, P., 2008, Objectivity,  Zone Books, Brooklyn.  
Davies, H., Nutley, S., & Smith, P., 2000,  What Works? Evidence-based Policy  and Practice in  Public 
services,  Policy Press, Bristol. 
Davies, P., 2012, ‘The State of Evidence-based Policy Evaluation and its role i  Policy formation’, 
Journal of the National institute of Economic  and Social Research, vol. 219: 41-52  
Dean, M., 191, The Constitution of Poverty, Routledge, London.  
Deutsch, D., 2012, The Beginning of Infinity, Riverview, New York.  
Drogin, B., 2007, Curveball: Spies, Lies and the Con Man who Caused a War, Harper, New York. 
Edwards, M., 2001, Social policy, Public Policy: From Problem to Practice,  Allen & Unwin, Sydney.  
Ellul, J., 1965, Propaganda: The formation of Men’s Attitudes, Vintage New York.  
Elster, J., 2007,  Explaining Social behaviour: More nuts and bolts  for the Social Sciences,  Cambridge 
university Press, Cambridge. Evans, M.,  2007, ‘The Art of Prescription: Theory and practice in 
Public administration research’,  Public Policy and Administration,  22 (1) 128-52.  
Evidence Network 2002, The History of Evidence Network, [Online] Available: 
http://www.evidencenetwork.org/history.asp [Dec. 6, 2002]. 
Festinger, L., 1957, A Theory of Cognitive dissonance, Stanford University Press, Stanford.  
Finlayson, A., 2004, ‘Meaning and politics: Assessing Bevir and Rhodes;, in British Journal of Politics 
and International relations,  vol.6 (2) 149-56 
Finnis, J. 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, Clarendon. 
Fischer, F.,  1998. ‘Beyond Empiricism: Policy inquiry in Postpositivist Perspective’, in  Policy Studies 
Journal,   vol 26. (1):  129-46 
Flyvbjerg B., 2004, Making Social Science Matter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Foucault, M., 1991,  ‘Governmentality’ in  Graham Burchell,  Colin Gordon, and Peter  Miller, (eds)The 
Foucault effect: Studies in Governmentality,  University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Frankfurt, H., 2005, On Bullshit, Princeton University Press, Princeton.  
Franklin, B. 1994, Packaging Politics: Political Communications in Britain’s Media Democracy, Edward 
Arnold, London.  
Frede , D., 2006, ‘The Question of being: Heidegger’s project, in . Guignon. C. 2006 (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (2nd ed) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Furedi, F., 2005,  Politics of Fear: Beyond Left and Right,  Continuum, London.   
Garnham, N., 1992,  The media and the public sphere. In C. Calhoun (Ed.).  
Glasby, J., Walshe K., & Harvey, G., 2007, What Counts as evidence in Evidence Based practice?,  
Evidence and Policy , Vol 3 (3) 325-27   
Grattan, M., 1997,’ The politics of spin’,  Australian Studies in Journalism, vol. 7: 1998: 32-45 
Grayling, A.C. 2003, What is Good? The Search for the best Way to Live, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
London.  
Graysion, L. 2007, Policy makers use evidence Only when it Suits them: Discuss, Center for Evidence 
Based Policy and Practice, London. 
Greenberg, K., & Lewis, A., 2005, (eds), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  
Guignon. C. 2006 (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (2nd ed) Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 
Haack, S., 1998, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago. 
Haack, S., 2007, Defending Science –Within Reason, Prometheus Books, Amherst.  
Hacking, I., 2004, Historical Ontology, Harvard Univerrsity Press,  Cambridge.   
 53 
Hansen, P., 1993, Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Harris, P. and Wring, D. 2002,  Political Marketing, London, Butterworth-  
Harris, P., Moss, D and Vetter, N. 1999, Machiavelli and Public Affairs: A  
Hay, C., 2002, Political Analysis: A critical introduction,  Palgrave, Macmillan. 
Head, B., 2008,  ‘Three lenses of  Evidence-based policy’,  Australian Journal of Public Administration, 
vol 67 (1) 1-11. 
Head, B., 2009,  ‘Evidence based policy: Principles and  requirements’,  in Productivity Commission,   
Strengthening Evidence based policy in the Australian Federation : Roundtable Proceedings,  
Canberra 17-18 August,   Vol 1:  13-26  
Heidegger, M., 1962, Being and Time (Trans J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson),SCM Press,  San Francisco,  
Herman, E.S., and Chomsky,N., 1988,  Manufacturing Consent, Pantheon, New York. 
Hirschman, A.O. 1997, The Passions and the Interests, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Ignatieff, M., (ed)., 2006, American Exceptionalism  and Human Rights, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton.  
Iyengar, S., Hahn,K., Krosnick, J.,  & Walker, J., 2008, ‘Selective Exposure to campaign Communication: 
The role of  anticipated Agreement and Issue Public membership’,   The Journal of Politics,  vol 
70,  (1) pp186-200   
Janis, I., 1953, ‘Effects of Fear Arousing Communications’,  Journal of  Abnormal  Psychology,  vol 48, 
pp 78-92 
Johnson, J., 1997, Cancer related Information Seeking, Hampton Press, Cresskill. 
Jones, N. 1995, Soundbites and Spin Doctors: How Politicians Manipulate Citizens Indigo London.   
Jones, N.,  1997, Campaign 1997: How the General Election was Won and Lost, Indigo, London.  
Kosseleck, R., 2002, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing concepts (Trans  T. 
Presner et al), Stanford University Press, Stanford .   
Kulthau, C., 1993,  ‘A Principle of  Uncertainty for Information seeking’,  Journal of  Documentation,  
vol 49,  (2), pp 339-55.  
Kurtz,  1998, Spin Cycle: Inside the Clinton Propaganda Machine, The Free Press, New York. 
Latham, M. 2001, ‘Myths of the Welfare State’, Policy, Vol 17, no 3, pp. 40-43.  
Law, J., 2004,   After Method: Mess in Social Science Research,  Routledge, Abingdon.  
Lemert, C., 1995,  Sociology after the Crisis,  Westview Press, Boulder.  
Leon, de p., & Weibel C., 2010,  ‘Policy process research for democracy: a commentary on Lasswell’s 
vision‘ International Journal of Policy Studies, Volume 1, Number 2, December  
Lindblom, C.,  1990, Inquiry and Change, Yale University Press,  New Haven.  
Lippmann, W., 1932, Public Opinion Allen&Unwin, London   
Marr, D., & Wilkinson, M., 2006 Dark Victory,  (2nd ed.) Allen & Unwin,  Sydney  
Martens,  P., and Roos, N.,  2005, ’When health services Researchers and  policy makers  interact: 
tales from the tectonic plates’,  Healthcare Policy,  vol 1 (10 72-84.   
Maslow, A., 1963, ‘The Need to Know and the Fear of Knowing’,  Journal of General Psychology vol 68 
: pp111-25 
Mayer, H.,  1994, Mayer on the Media: Issues and Arguments,  Tiffin, R.,  (ed), Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards.  
Mol, Anne-Marie, 2003, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice, Duke University Press,  
Durham.    
Moore, N., 2007, The Origins of Modern Spin, Palgrave, London   
Mulgan, G., 2005 ‘Government , Knowledge and the Business of Policy Making: the Potential and 
Limits of Evidence-Based Policy’,  Evidence and Policy,  vol.1, (2) 215-226 
National Health and Medical Research Council (2003) Practitioner Fellowships, [Online], Available: 
www.health.gov.au/nhmrc/research/train/practfly.htm [2003, Jan. 16] 
Nussbaum, M., 1986, The Fragility of Goodness, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Nutley, S. Davies, H. & Walter, I. 2002, Evidence Based Policy and Practice: Cross Sector Lessons from 
the UK, Keynote paper for the Social Policy Research and Evaluation Conference, Wellington, 
New Zealand, 2-3 July. 
Nutley, S., 2003,  ‘Bridging the policy/Research divide’,  Facing the Future Conference, National 
Institute of Governance Conference,  Canberra  23-24 april  
O’Connor, A., 2000, Poverty Knowledge, Princeton university Press, Princeton.  
O’Dwyer, L., 2004,  A Critical Review of Evidence Based policy,  AHURI Final Report  No. 58, May  
AHURI Southern Research Center,  Melbourne  
 54 
O’Keefe, D., 1990, Persuasion Theory and Research, Sage Newbury Park 
Oakley, A., 2000, Experiments in Knowing, Polity Press, Cambridge.   
Oancea A., & Furlong, J., 2007,  ‘Expressions of Excellence and the Assessment of Applied and Practice 
based Research’, Research Papers in Education,  vol.22 (2) pp. 119-37 
Orwell, G., 1946, ‘Politics and the English language’, in Shooting the Elephant and Other essays,  
Secker & Warburg, London 
Parsons, W. 2001, Modernising Policy-making for the Twenty First Century: The Professional Model, in 
Public Policy and Administration, vol. 16, no 3, pp. 93-110.  
Parsons, W.,  2002, ‘From Muddling through to  Muddling up: evidence based policy and the 
modernisation of British government’,  Public Policy Administration  vol 17 (3) 43-60  
Pearson, M.,  and Mclean, H.,  2010, "Quantifying government media relations in Queensland "Public 
communication review, 1 (2), 18-32. 
Pearson, M., & Patching, R., 2008, Government media relations: A Spin through the Literatur’, 
Humanities & Social Sciences papers. Paper 228.http://epublications.bond.edu.au/hss_pubs/228 
Peel, M., 2003, The Lowest Rung, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Perri, S. (2002) 'Can Policy Making be Evidence Based?' MCC Building knowledge for integrated care, 
vol 10, no 1, pp. 3-9.  
Pielke, R.,  2007, The Honest broker: making sense of science in policy and politics,  Cambridge 
University Press,  New York 
Popper, K., 2002,  Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, London.   
Productivity Commission, 2009, Strengthening Evidence based policy in the Australian Federation: 
Roundtable Proceedings,  Canberra 17-18 August,   (2 Vols)  
Public Policy Institute, 2011, ‘Wicked problems: Do they exist?’ Policy Update  Issue 2  23 March     
Putnam, H., 2005,  The Fact Value dichotomy and other Essays, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge.   
Quine, W., 1974, ‘On Popper’s Negative Methodology’, in Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Karl Popper, The Library of Living Philosophers; Open Court Publishing, 
La Salle. 
 Rampton, S., & Stauber, J.,  2003, Weapons of Mass Deception, Hodder London.  
Reid, F., 2003, ‘Evidence Based policy -Where is the  evidence for it?’ Working Paper 3, School for 
Policy Studies, University of Bristol. 
Reynolds, S. 2000, 'The Anatomy of Evidence-Based Practice: Principles and Methods', in Evidence-
Based Practice: A Critical Appraisal, (eds) L. Trinder & S. Reynolds, Blackwell Science, Oxford. 
Rintal, R.,  &  Real, K.,  2003, ‘Perceived Risk and Efficacy Beliefs as Motivators of Change: Use of the 
Risk Perception Attitude (RPA) Framework to Understand Health Behaviour’,  Human 
Communications Research,  Vol 29 (3) pp. 370-99. 
Rose, J., 1996, States of Fantasy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Rose, N. 1999, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge.  
Rose, N., 1996, ‘The death of the Social: Refiguring the territory of Government, Economy and Society,  
vol.25. (3)  
Rosenstock, L. and Lee, J. 2002, 'Attacks on science: The risks to evidence-based policy', American 
Journal of Public Health, vol 92, Issue 1, pp. 14-18.  
Rudd, K. 2008, Prime Minister: Address to Heads of Agencies and Members of  Senior Executive 
Service, 30 April, http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5817  
Sanderson, I. 2002, Making Sense of 'What Works': Evidence-Based Policy Making as Instrumental 
Rationality? Paper presented at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference Aberdeen, 
5th- 7th 2002.  
Schon, D.,  1999,  Frame Reflection: Towards the resolution of Intractable policy Controversies, Basic 
Books, New York.  
Shapin, S., 1996, A Social history of Truth, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Sharp, G., 1974, 'Interpretations of Poverty', ANZJS, vol.10, no.3 pp. 194-199. 
Socialism Today,  2003 Editorial: ‘Spin or the Art of Lying’, Issue 77, September, 
http://www.socialismtoday.org/77/hutton.html 
 55 
Solesbury, W. 2001, Evidence Based Policy Whence it Came and Where it's Going, ESRC UK Centre for 
Evidence Based Policy and Practice: Working Paper 1, ESRCF UK Centre for Evidence Based 
Policy and Practice, London.  
Stockwell, S.,  2007, ‘The Spin Doctors: Government media Advisers’ In S. Young (Ed.).  
Tallis, R., 2011, Aping Mankind; Neuromania, Darwinitis and  the Misrepresentation of Humanity,  
Acumen, London,  
The Campbell Collaboration 2003, About the Campbell Collaboration, [Online], Available: 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/FraAbout.html [2003, Jan. 14] 
The Cochrane Collaboration 2003, Brochure, [Online}, Available: 
http://www.cochrane.org/cochrane/cc-broch.htm [2003, Jan. 13] 
Tilley, N. & Laycock, G. 2000, Joining up Research, Policy and Practice about Crime, Policy Studies, vol 
21, no 3, pp. 213-227. 
Trinder, L. 2000, 'Introduction: the context of evidence-based practice', in Evidence-Based Practice: A 
Critical Appraisal, eds L. Trinder & S. Reynolds, Blackwell Science, Oxford. 
Trinder, L. and Reynolds, S. (eds) 2000, Evidence-Based Practice: A Critical Appraisal, Blackwell 
Science, Oxford. 
United States Coalition for Evidence Based Policy 2002, Program Description, [Online], Available: 
http://www.excelgov.org/displayContent.asp?Keyword=prppcProgDesc [Feb, 6, 2002] 
van Onselen, P., and  Errington, W., 2005, ‘The Government Members’ Secretariat: The beating heart 
of Australia’s PR state’, paper delivered at the ANZCA Conference Christchurch, New Zealand, 
4–7 July. 
Vlastos, G., 1991, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Ward, I. 2003,  An Australian PR state? Australian Journal of Communication, 30(1), 25-42.   
Watson, D., 2002, Recollections of a Bleeding Heart: A Portrait of Paul Keating, Knopf, Sydney. 
Wells, P., 2004, ‘New Labour and Evidence Based Policy Making’, Paper presented to the PERC 
Research Seminar  16th May 2004 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research Sheffield 
Hallam University, Sheffield.  
Whitworth, J. 1998, Better Health Outcomes Newsletter, vol 4, no 2 pp. 1-4. 
Wikipedia 2012, ‘Evidence-based policy’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence-based_policy 
Winter, I., & Seelig, T., 2001, Housing Research, Policy Relevance and a Housing Imagination in 
Australia, unpublished conference paper, presented at 2001 Housing Studies Association 
Conference, Cardiff University, September. 
Wolin, S., 2008, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted 
Totalitarianism, Princeton University Press, Princeton.  
Young, K., Ashby, D., Annette, B., & Grayson, L., 2002, ‘Social Science and the Evidence-based Policy 
Movement, Social Policy & Society, vol 1 no 3, pp. 215-224. 
Young, S.,  2011, Evidence of democracy? The relationship between evidence-based policy and 
democratic government’,  Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research,   vol. 3 (1) 19-
027 
Zussman, D., 2003,  ‘Evidence-based Policy Making: Some Observations of Recent Canadian 
Experience’, Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, Issue 20:  64-71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
POOL 
 
 
The point is only that a fact, an event can never be 
witnessed by anyone who may want to know about 
it, whereas rational or mathematical truth presents 
itself as self-evident to everyone endowed with the 
same brain power; its compelling nature is 
universal, while the compelling force of factual 
truth is limited; it does not reach those who not 
having been witnesses, have to rely on the 
testimony of others, whom one may or may not 
believe. The true opposite of factual, as 
distinguished from rational truth  is not error or 
illusion but the deliberate lie. 
Hannah  Arendt: 1975: 59 
 
 
 
